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http://cide.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/handle/1011/851| Quantal response equilibrium in a citizen-candidate experiment | |
| DARIO TRUJANO OCHOA | |
| ALBERTO ALEXANDER ELBITTAR HEIN | |
| Acceso Abierto | |
| Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas | |
| Political candidates -- Elections -- Decision making -- Mathematical models. | |
| In this thesis I address the next question: can the QRE theory, with more realistic assumptions, explain better the behavior than Nash Equilibrium (NE) in an experiment based in Citizen-Candidate model? The contribution of this thesis is to answer this question with the analysis of data from the election experiment assuming that agents are not rational, but they are strategic. In this sense, this work is located at the intersection of two perspectives: first, Behavioral Game Theory (Camerer, 2003; Gächter, 2004), where QRE can be considered; and second, Political Economy (Besley, 2007), where the citizen-candidate model is an important instance. I conclude that, considering stochastic and non-perfect maximizing decision rule, it is possible to better describe candidates’ decisions in the experiment. | |
| El autor | |
| 2017 | |
| Tesis de maestría | |
| Inglés | |
| Estudiantes | |
| CIENCIAS SOCIALES | |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Maestría en Economía |
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