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SHARED TERRAINS: WHEN AND WHY VIOLENT RESISTANCE WORKS

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Abstract

When does violence help dissidents succeed? In this study, I investigate the conditions under which violence can help dissidents to achieve concessions from rulers. I reframe this problem of concessions as a commitment problem for dissidents. By distinguishing mixed campaigns where moderate and radical groups share the conflict terrain, I argue that violence works when moderates avoid coordination with radicals. For such mixed but uncoordinated campaigns, violence raises the costs for rulers by provoking instability and by increasing the public support for moderates. Moreover, as moderates can plausibly deny their links with radicals, they become credible in their promises increasing rulers' utility to concede. I also explore how, conditional on this lack of coordination, higher levels of violence can be useful if they significantly raise the costs of rulers for not giving in and if, along with more violence, rulers acquire more options to co-opt dissident groups. The empirical analysis shows first that mixed uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed than violent ones, although not more successful than coordinated campaigns. Second, it shows that when moderates avoid coordination and violent and non-violent actions simultaneously increase, frontal violence increases, or both violence and the number of groups increase, uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed.

1. Introduction¹

From 1983 to 1989, Chile experienced a dissident campaign with the goal of deposing the military regime led by Augusto Pinochet. Non-violent protests and strikes directed by moderate groups constantly occurred during these years. Along with moderates, however, radical groups such as the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez were also active conducting armed attacks against government and military figures. Such a mixed campaign was crucial for the regime to open the political system (Figueroa Clark 2015). Why do some dissident campaigns seeking maximalist goals like regime change succeed, as the one in Chile, while others do not?

In this research, I consider as dissident success any instance where dissidents receive concessions from rulers—even if they are mild ones—that are linked to the path of achieving their ultimate goals such as regime change, secession, anti-occupation, or autonomy. According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), non-violent dissident campaigns are more likely to succeed than violent ones. Chile did not have a civil war, but these armed attacks were far from isolated violent events of provocateurs, yet, the anti-Pinochet campaign was successful.² Thus, under what conditions does violence helps dissidents succeed?

To answer this question, I reframe the outcome of concessions as a commitment problem for dissidents directly linked to rulers' utility to concede. Rulers' utility depends on their *costs* for not giving in and on rulers' assurances about dissidents' commitments. Most researchers who analyze the effects of different dissident strategies on their likelihood of success focus on how they raise the costs for rulers (Pape 2003; Thomas 2014; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2019; Butcher, Gray, and Mitchell 2018). However, I argue that it is important to consider how dissidents ensure rulers they will fulfill their promises.

I also start from the idea that, rather than a deliberate choice of dissidents (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Bakker, Hill, and Moore 2016), if we observe that a dissident campaign follows a given strategy—violence, non-violence, or both—it is because one group, either moderates or radicals managed to prevail in such campaign. If moderates prevail, campaigns

¹ I thank the valuable feedback of Luis De la Calle, Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer, María Inclán, Fernando Valdés, Saúl Ascencio, Helga Jáuregui, Mauricio Aguilar, and Rafael Pabón.

² The movement to vote “no” in the referendum was very important; however, as some authors argue, the dynamics of dissent and especially the armed campaign of the left was crucial for the regime to give initial concessions previous to the referendum (Figueroa Clark 2015).

will follow a non-violent strategy; if radicals do so, the campaign will be violent. This is the distinction scholars do in recent studies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Often, however, both groups share the conflict terrain, producing mixed campaigns which can be disaggregated in two subtypes. *Mixed uncoordinated campaigns* emerge when moderates are dominant in the campaign and can thus avoid coordinating with radicals. *Mixed coordinated campaigns* occur when radicals are dominant in the campaign and thus moderates prefer to coordinate with them. In this research, I examine how each of these arrangements shape both the costs and assurances for rulers, which then shape rulers' utility to concede.

Following this framework, I argue that violence works for *mixed uncoordinated campaigns*. In these cases, violence raises the costs for rulers in two ways. Directly by harming the economy. Indirectly by increasing support for moderates because, as they plausibly deny being coordinated with radicals, they turn into a credible and preferable option for the public to deposit its support. In addition, as moderates avoid coordination with radicals and plausibly deny such links, they can be credible in the fulfilment of their promises. Combined, both effects increase the incentives for rulers to concede. In contrast, if radicals predominate in the campaign, even though violence may raise the costs for rulers, moderates will not be credible fulfilling their promises.

The latter argument considers violence as a dichotomous strategy, as several scholars do (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2019; Chenoweth and Schock 2015), but violence can vary in its levels. To analyze the effects of violence as a continuous strategy, I take a closer look into mixed campaigns. In so doing, I argue that *if moderates avoid coordination with radicals*, higher levels of violence can be useful if they *significantly raise the costs of rulers* for not giving in; and if, along with more violence, rulers acquire *more options to co-opt* dissident groups.

More violence can significantly increase the costs for rulers under two conditions. One is when there are more frontal attacks, such as attacks against military facilities or assassinations of officials. These attacks require radicals to have some degree of direct military contact with security agents. As such, they impose higher costs for rulers by signalling the strength of radical groups, in contrast with other violent tactics such as riots or underground attacks. The other condition is when violence simultaneously increases with non-violent protests. This relationship

is nonlinear. If both strategies reach similar levels of intensity, the costs of rulers for not giving in would reach the highest levels. But when violence predominates, the likelihood of success dwindles as rulers have less assurances about the promises of moderates.

Rulers acquire *more options to co-opt* when there are *more groups* within the dissident campaign. More groups increase the likelihood that rulers will find actors who are closer to their ideal points. Thus, when violence simultaneously increases with the number of dissident groups, two effects occur: more violence raises the costs of rulers for not giving in whereas additional groups increase the options for the ruler to divide the movement through cooptation (Cunningham 2011). Consequently, the likelihood of concessions for the campaign increases—even though these concessions might benefit only some factions.

By integrating existing data about dissident campaigns and non-state political violence from 1955 to 2013 (Chenoweth and Shay 2019; LaFree and Dugan 2007; Banks and Wilson 2013), I find general support for my arguments. Regarding all campaign types, mixed uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed than violent ones—although at least as likely as coordinated ones. Regarding mixed campaigns, I find that when violent and non-violent actions increase simultaneously, when frontal violence increases, and when both violence and the number of groups increase, uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed.

2. The Effects of Violence on the Success of Dissident Campaigns

Scholars who focus on dissidents' strategies as the explanation for dissident success center on the divergent effectiveness of using violence or nonviolence. For many conflict scholars, dissidents use violence as a device to mobilize potential followers and to pressure the state to concede (De La Calle 2015, 4, 14; de Figueiredo and Weingast 2011; Lake 2002; della Porta 1995; Kydd and Walter 2006). With that logic, some scholars argue that when dissidents heighten the levels of violence and specifically of suicide attacks, they are more likely to succeed. Violence provokes rulers to harshly repress, increasing support for dissidents; increases the levels of destruction, showing the inability of the state to maintain control; and increases the expectations of further and costly violence (Thomas 2014; Pape 2003).

Other authors, however, posit that if dissidents target civilians more often, they are less likely to succeed.³ This strategy either misinforms governments about their extreme preferences, lowering the incentives of elites to concede, signals weakness, or increases people’s grievances, motivating individuals to support government repression lowering the chances of concessions (Fortna 2015; Abrahms 2006; Bueno de Mesquita 2013). Targeting civilians, however, might be an endogenous strategy of weak groups who lack the capabilities to further pressure the state to concede, which explains the poor record of success for these groups (De La Calle, Foley, and Sánchez-Cuenca 2011). In contrast, other scholars argue that if dissidents focus on targeting the military, they are more likely to succeed because of the legitimacy of the targets—at least for dissidents’ followers—and because they can effectively provoke the government to repress, which may increase support for their cause (Abrahms 2012; Connable and Libicki 2010).

Chenoweth and Stephan (2008; 2011), however, find that non-violent dissidents have a higher success record than their violent counterparts (i.e. armed rebels fighting civil wars). With nonviolence, dissidents are more able to damage the regime’s bases of support by bringing masses of people on the streets, as costly and risky military training is not necessary for protesters. The high number of people, in consequence, reduces government repression, as rulers may alienate their internal and external supporters if they were to use force; and, most importantly, a great number of dissidents provoke elites to split in favor of the dissidents.

An important shortcoming of this study was that they only distinguished between “primarily” violent or non-violent campaigns, considering violent groups inside non-violent movements as marginal. As Chenoweth and Stephan argue (2011, 28): “Often those who employ violence in mass movements are members of fringe groups (...) It is nevertheless possible to characterize a campaign as principally nonviolent based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance.” Many cases, however, show the contrary: organized groups who use violence systematically and who are not necessarily fringe groups often coexist with non-violent groups (della Porta 1995; Case 2018; Belgioioso 2018; Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2019; Figueroa Clark 2015; Garreton 1988).

³ This may be labeled as a terrorist strategy, but I avoid using the term given its intrinsic problematics (De La Calle, Foley, and Sánchez-Cuenca 2011; De La Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2011)

Scholars in the tradition of social movements suggest that when both actors concur, two effects might occur. A positive radical flank effect: radicals benefit moderates as the latter are considered more reasonable to negotiate with. Or, a negative flank effect: radicals harm moderates because they lower moderate's legitimacy (Haines 1984, 32–33, 41; Braithwaite 2014; Schock 2005, 157). Chenoweth and Shock studied such hypotheses for non-violent campaigns and found that radical flanks reduce the likelihood of success, although this effect was not significant (2015, 435–36).

Other scholars dig deeper arguing that when dissident movements have hierarchical structures of leadership, they are more likely to succeed as governments will have incentives to concede and, given that non-violent leaders have incentives to reduce violence, they will isolate radicals (Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2019). These authors find that non-violent movements with hierarchical structures and violent groups *who are part of the movement* are more likely to succeed than their counterparts.

There are several remaining gaps. There is no clarity about rulers' utility to concede: if violence can generate higher costs than nonviolence, why would leaders want to concede to dissidents? Further, scholars who analyze the dynamics of radical flanks do not explain under what conditions will there be a positive or radical flank effect. Belgioioso *et al.* (2019) to some extent answer that question arguing about hierarchies; but why would rulers want to concede to very organized groups who can cheat after concessions by starting a civil war? In the end, most civil wars erupt because groups with hierarchical leadership can coordinate military networks to fight against the state. Finally, scholars analyzing the simultaneous presence of radicals and moderates overlook the continuous nature of violence or the effects of its different repertoires. In this paper, I try to answer these questions by proposing a broader theoretical framework that incorporates rulers' assurances about moderates and propose several hypotheses about how the dynamics of violence can motivate concessions.

3. When Does Violence Work?

3.1 *The Utility of Rulers*

I suggest the success of dissident campaigns is defined by the incentives of rulers to give concessions. Rulers' choices matter: they are the very actors who concede through assessing how costly is to tolerate institutional changes or to maintain the status quo (Przeworski 1991; Bermeo 1997). Here, I also focus on the actions of opposition actors, but I try to clarify how they shape rulers' decision to concede or not. I assume that rulers are unitary actors and not ruling coalitions composed of reformers and hard liners or pivotal elites (Przeworski 1991; Bermeo 1997). To some extent, my arguments speaks to the incentives of pivotal elites or reformers; I assume, however, that dissidents not only target reformers but a whole regime.

By launching a campaign, dissidents try to change the utility of rulers for conceding. Such a utility function depends on two parameters: the *costs* of not giving in and the *assurances* rulers have about dissidents' commitments. Formally, the function is:

$$U_t^r(c, a) = c_t + a_{t+1}$$

Sub-index t implies that the utility is contemporaneous and super-index r that the utility function belongs to rulers. The parameter c are the costs in time t and it is a function of three parameters:

$$c_t = \delta_t + \lambda_t + \theta_t$$

- δ_t : human costs i.e. damage to populations (deaths, injured people, fear), which will translate into less support for the regime and more support for dissidents—although particularly for moderate factions, as I will detail below.⁴
- λ_t : economic costs (production shortages, property damage).
- θ_t : political costs (defections of elites: security agents and politicians).

The a parameter represents the assurances for rulers about dissidents' commitments in the future, and it is a function of three parameters:

⁴ Dissident campaigns are instances where rulers already have few support bases. However, it is known that only a small fraction of the population tends to participate (Lichbach 1995). If costs raise too much, this fraction might keep increasing.

$$a_{t+1} = \xi_{t+1} + \phi_{t+1} + \alpha_{t+1}$$

- ξ_{t+1} : assurances of being safe i.e. that dissidents will not kill rulers during or after negotiations;
- ϕ_{t+1} : assurances of future positions of power;
- α_{t+1} : assurances of negotiations without spoilers.

In terms of the costs for rulers, dissidents try to raise them implementing strategies to *hurt* the regime (Schelling 1966). Protests, armed attacks, strikes, and demonstrations hurt the regime by undermining its bases of support and its ability to maintain control. This had been the focus of many studies regarding the effect of dissident strategies on their likelihood of success. As outlined above, some authors argue that *violence* is the strategy that hurts the state the most. Others argue that *nonviolence* is a superior strategy because it drains the bases of support for governments.⁵ And, others have argued that *both strategies* may work but only if there are hierarchies in the campaign.

All these arguments speak especially to the parameter of costs c in the utility function of rulers, but as some scholars suggest, rulers also need assurances and thus they also matter to explain dissident success (E. J. Wood 2000, 214; Bermeo 1997). I argue these assurances will depend on the credibility of moderates to fulfill their promises. And, if moderates are credible, campaigns will be successful depending on the intensity of violent and non-violent actions, the violent tactics radicals use, and the levels of fragmentation of the campaign.

To clarify this point, I am assuming that any dissident campaign always involves two groups: radicals and moderates. Radical groups will prefer to use violence, and moderate groups non-violence. Rather than a deliberate choice made by dissidents (Bakker, Hill, and Moore 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), campaigns will be violent, non-violent, or experience both methods because one actor prevails or both share the conflict terrain. As some scholars have noted recently, dissident campaigns vary their methods given different actor profiles (Dahl et al. 2014). I argue that if both actors are present, they may coordinate their actions or not which

⁵ Even though Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) argue that violent movements try to undermine the capacity of the state whereas non-violent ones its legitimacy, both cases would imply hurting the state, but in different ways.

will affect rulers' utility in different ways. In what follows, I detail how each group shapes the utility of rulers to concede and when violence helps dissidents achieve concessions.

3.2 How Radicals and Moderates Affect Rulers' Costs and Assurances

Moderates do not increase human costs (δ_t) because they avoid using violence. Instead of fear and mayhem, moderates tend to worry for peaceful means and the inclusion of broad bases of support (Rivera and Gleditsch 2013). Radicals, in contrast, especially increase such a parameter reducing rulers' popular support. Through violence, dissidents can motivate people to support dissident groups.⁶ Violence induces fear among state supporters and the whole population signaling rulers have no control which may motivate people to side with protesters (Thomas 2014). Violence can also turn people to dissidents' side by agitating disaffected individuals (De La Calle 2015; della Porta 1995) or by provoking rulers to repress alienating populations (Lake 2002; Kydd and Walter 2006).

Both groups, however, increase economic costs (λ_t). Moderates stop economic activity through protests and strikes, reducing the flow of resources for rulers (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 64–70; Butcher, Gray, and Mitchell 2018). Radicals affect economic outcomes mainly through destruction. Through armed attacks against property or against civilians, radicals reduce incentives for investment. In turn, radicals reduce the flow of taxes and reduce elites' revenues motivating such elites to pressure the state to concede (E. J. Wood 2001).

Finally, moderates increase political costs (θ_t) by provoking more regime defections. When dissidents *commit to nonviolence* and *mobilize masses of people* on the streets, they are more likely to motivate elites to side with them. By committing to nonviolence, political figures will be more willing to side with dissidents because this can ensure future popular support. If dissidents were violent, such political figures may be labelled as extremists and dangerous by potential followers. In addition, security agents may find it morally harder to repress thousands of non-violent dissidents. Using force in these conditions tends to generate more introspection about its viability among repressive agents (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 69). Moreover, using

⁶ As I will argue below, these alienated people will turn their support to moderate factions if they are able to maintain the non-violent discipline.

force can cause negative effects in normative and legitimacy terms for repressive agents: internal ranks might end up demoralized, they can face public outrage by political elites, and generalized reproaches (Beissinger 2004, 347–54).

Bringing masses of people to the streets, dissidents can provide a sense of an incoming victory which would give more incentives for elites to side with the potentially victorious side (Lichbach 1995, 64–66). Masses of people also make repressive agents less likely to repress because they are more likely to share personal networks with protesters and because it is logistically harder to repress thousands of protesters (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Przeworski 1991, 64). With both conditions, repressive agents tend to turn their support for the opposition (Przeworski 1991; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2013).

By their very nature, moderates are committed to nonviolence and, consequently, more able to bring masses of people to the streets. Non-violent methods imply less costs for people to participate, as there is no need for military training, engagement in risky operations, and exit costs are lower. Radicals, in contrast, are committed to violence and their methods imply higher costs for potential dissidents (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 66–67; White et al. 2015, 478). Therefore, moderates will cause political costs for the ruler through more elite defections, whereas radicals will not.

In terms of *assurances*, rulers are less likely to approach radicals than moderates. Radicals are more likely to sabotage negotiations and to attack political leaders involved (Kydd and Walter 2002), turning ξ_{t+1} and α_{t+1} parameters negative. In case radicals were willing to negotiate, they will be less willing than moderates to include elites from the old regime in future governing coalitions, turning ϕ_{t+1} negative.

Moderates, in contrast, always have the highest advantage because of their very nature. Moderates tend to rely on broad bases of support that expect the use on non-violent methods (Rivera and Gleditsch 2013, 390; Dahl et al. 2014). As such, they are less willing to sabotage negotiations or to kill rulers. Otherwise, they would lose the masses of support they managed to mobilize initially, which makes ξ_{t+1} and α_{t+1} parameters positive. Institutionally, moderates rely on power dispersion and the formation of loose coalitions of support to maintain their struggle (Rivera and Gleditsch 2013, 391; Butcher, Gray, and Mitchell 2018). These features, make them more likely to support forms of power sharing and to underpin democratic

institutions (Rivera and Gleditsch 2013, 391). Consequently, they are more willing to ensure that rulers will hold positions of power, turning ϕ_{t+1} . In cases of complete transitions, for instance, they would be more willing to accept elites from the old regime in the new governing coalition (Rivera and Gleditsch 2013). In cases of mild concessions, moderates will be more willing to receive some spoils in exchange for giving elites amnesties or for keeping past institutions working (Garreton 1988, 11; Rivera and Gleditsch 2013; Figueroa Clark 2015, 496).

Moderates could still renege on these promises after receiving concessions. However, I argue that they are less likely to do so than radicals because of several reasons. One is that, as detailed above, moderates as a group have institutional limitations to avoid renegeing on their promises. Specifically, by relying on power sharing arrangements and often on the defense of democratic institutions to keep their bases of support, moderate leaders are expected to accomplish their agreements. Otherwise, they might lose their bases of support because not even their followers would have incentives to support them in the future.

Another reason is that they prefer to fulfill their promises to have at least some degree of access to power rather than risk to be excluded. By engaging in campaigns, moderates are trying to gain or regain access to power given they are currently out of power. If they were to renege on their promises, they would be more likely to return to be excluded because of retaliations from rulers. As in the Chilean campaign against Pinochet, moderates were people who actively helped to bring down Allende, but when they did not enjoy power with the military, they moved to oppose them. Once the campaign started in early 1980s, however, the same moderates reneged to change all the regime completely, as their radical counterparts, and accepted mild concessions (Figueroa Clark 2015). Finally, in empirical terms, many studies suggest moderate dissident factions tend to be more credible as rulers commonly prefer them as a better “devil” to whom deliver concessions (Cunningham 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2019; Figueroa Clark 2015, 518; Garreton 1988, 10).

Rulers, consequently, are more likely to have positive assurances that dissidents will fulfill their promises by agreeing to moderates’ demands and negative ones by conceding to radicals. As the Chilean case illustrates, when the military faced mass demonstrations along with armed attacks, they turned to moderate middle classes to provide concessions such as debt

relief, the return of exiles, critical media, and political spaces, rather than approaching armed radicals of the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodriguez (Figueroa Clark 2015; Garretton 1988).

In sum, radicals reduce the utility of rulers to concede whereas moderates increase it. It is important to note that both groups will impose costs on the ruler. Radicals will keep the c parameter positive i.e. there will be increasing costs for rulers by not giving in, but the difference with moderates is that radicals will make the a parameter negative. In what follows, I will explain how different compositions between radicals and moderates' shapes concessions.

3.3 Violent and Non-violent Campaigns: When One Group Prevails

I suggested that inside dissident campaigns one group might prevail, either radicals or moderates. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argued that dissidents are more likely to succeed when they use non-violent methods than when they turn to violence. I posit, however, that it is not only because of the methods they use, but because non-violent campaigns imply that *moderates prevail*, which increases rulers' utility to concede.

When moderates prevail, they impose economic and political costs while avoiding human costs given the lack of violence—just as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) suggest. But, as I propose, the prevalence of moderates also implies positive assurances for rulers. Moderates are better off without violence and more likely to fulfill their promises. For example, in the recent case of Sudan in 2019, the prevalence of moderates in the campaign allowed to form a transition government with members of the old military and opposition groups. Facing political and economic costs along with positive assurances, rulers would have incentives to concede. Thus, we should observe that:

Implication 1a: non-violent dissident campaigns will be the most likely to succeed in contrast with any other type of campaign.

When *radicals prevail*, in contrast, the assurances will be negative, reducing rulers' utility function. If rulers negotiate, dissidents may employ violence to kill them even when they promise not to do so. Spoiling through violence is very likely as military factions will try to

make negotiators non-credible (Kydd and Walter 2002). Moreover, rulers will not have future power positions as radicals will want everyone out. Given the general levels of destruction, human and economic costs for rulers will be high. This may increase the utility for rulers to concede but, as assurances are low, concessions will be rare. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) suggest, political costs will be low in terms of defections as elites will have incentives to keep their support for the ruler (see also: White et al. 2015). Thus, I expect that:

Implication 1b: violent campaigns will be the least likely to succeed in contrast with other campaigns.

3.3 Mixed Campaigns: When Both Groups Share the Conflict Terrain

What happens when both groups share the conflict terrain? That is, when dissident campaigns are *mixed*? In such a context, both radicals and moderates want to win the conflict and prefer to share the spoils with their closer constituency (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). As such, each group would be better off without the other one, but given they cannot prevail over each other their relative strength will determine if they coordinate or not.⁷ I assume that the equilibriums achieved by both actors are visible for rulers and the public so they can identify the nature of the campaign and make further decisions.

When moderates have more relative strength, they will be the dominant actor. Given radical use to mobilize fewer participants (Dahl et al. 2014), if moderates prefer coordination, radicals would prefer to do so as well because they would have more dissidents on their side. But when moderates prefer no coordination, radicals will also avoid coordinating as they are not willing to change their methods and prefer to push their armed campaign. In fact, this situation would be the only possible equilibrium: each actor will choose her best response to what the other does. Moderates always prefer to avoid coordination; otherwise, they would run the risk of not gaining concessions. Consequently, and given moderates dominate, radicals end up to

⁷ I provided a more detailed model of the following game in the appendix.

choosing no coordination as well. Under these circumstances, we will observe mixed but *uncoordinated campaigns*.⁸

When radicals have more relative strength, however, they are the dominant actor. Given they can mobilize few dissidents (Dahl et al. 2014), radicals will try to augment their numbers and will always be willing to accept moderates in their movement. I argued that moderates are more likely to receive concessions from the government which might harm radicals. But if radicals dominate the campaign, they are not credible in their promises and they would face punishments from the radical core if they were to defect. Instead, they will always prefer to accept coordination with radicals to avoid punishment but to simultaneously avoid losing relevance in the conflict. In this case, then, both groups would have dominant preferences for coordination, and we will thus observe mixed but *coordinated campaigns*.

How does each composition change the utility function of rulers? In mixed uncoordinated campaigns, the actions of both groups increase the three parameters of costs for rulers that I suggested: human (δ_t), economic (λ_t), and political (θ_t). Moderates increase economic costs through protests and strikes, and political costs inciting regime defections.

Radicals also increase economic costs through property damage which reduces the incentives for investment. In these contexts, radicals will also increase the human costs for the regime, while generating a positive externality for moderate groups. By launching armed campaigns, radicals will induce fear or provoke the regime to harshly repress populations (Thomas 2014; Lake 2002). In both cases, people may be more likely to stop supporting the regime and more likely to increase their support for dissidents. However, radicals are not a convenient outlet to deposit such support as they are more likely to further damage the population. Instead, I posit, people will look for moderates as a better option: in the end, they are less willing than the government and radicals to use violence. Indeed, some scholars suggest that when radical actions start, people is more willing to support moderate factions not only politically but also financially (Haines 1984). The effect of this heightened support for moderates, then, ends up increasing the costs of rulers for not giving in. For example, a ruler

⁸ Examples from Chile, Philippines, and Algeria suggest that moderates actively publicize their unwillingness to engage in violence and their separation from radical groups (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008; Garretton 1988; Martinez 2000; Hafez 2000).

having less popular support would lose leverage in future negotiations or even in future political contests such as electoral periods.

As I suggested, however, rulers also care about the assurances they have about dissidents' commitments. If they face violent actions from radical groups, they might keep renegeing given that their lives and positions of power would be in risk and because moderates might be not credible in their promises. In the context of a mixed uncoordinated campaign, however, rulers will have certainty that moderates will remain as such because *moderates can plausibly deny their links with moderates*. Thus, rulers will be willing to concede. As I argued, they will prefer to negotiate with moderates as they are more likely to fulfill their promises. In other words, the presence of a credible moderate faction, gives rulers the assurances they need to stop costs from growing and motivates them to concede.

A challenge for rulers, yet, would be that radicals might continue with their armed campaigns, especially if moderates have no links with them to stop their actions. However, given that moderates enjoy higher public support due to radical violence, repression of the remaining radical factions would become acceptable for the public reducing the likelihood of backfire. This would leave open room for repressive agents to diminish the radical threat, substituting the control moderates can exert over them. Moderates would prefer this to happen as they are better off without radicals to get the concessions they seek. And, thus, moderates would keep their position as credible and convenient bargaining actors. For example, in the case of the Chilean transition “the elite and the moderate opposition, had no interest in redeeming an armed resistance that had been a major threat. In hindsight, it was presented as at best pointless, and at worst criminal (Figueroa Clark 2015, 496).” In the case of Egypt, as well, repressive actions increased without much condemnation once Mubarak stepped down from power and the military allowed the Muslim Brothers to compete for power (Castañeda Reyes 2012, 241–42).

In summary, *violence will work* when both radicals and moderates *share the conflict terrain*, but if the former avoid coordination with the latter. As some authors suggest for the case of democratization in Spain: “[i]ronically, violence may have facilitated the agreement between regime reformists and opposition moderates, as consensus was all the more urgent in the face of extremist attacks” (Sánchez-Cuenca and Aguilar 2009, 435). In the words of social

movement theorists, under these conditions is when would observe a *positive* radical flank effect (Haines 1984, 41; Schock 2005, 157). I thus expect that:

Implication 1c: mixed uncoordinated campaigns will be more likely to succeed than violent campaigns.

In mixed coordinated campaigns, in contrast, dissidents will find harder to give rulers the assurances they need as they will be more less likely to find moderates credible. As moderates coordinate their actions with radicals, rulers will infer that spoilers are likely ($-\alpha_{t+1}$), that their lives are at risk ($-\xi_{t+1}$), and that dissidents will not offer future positions of power ($-\phi_{t+1}$). Many people will participate in the campaign limiting repression levels, but less than when moderates avoid coordination. Human costs (δ_t) might be high because rulers will lose support, but these costs will not be high enough as people will not have a credible moderate faction to support. Economic (λ_t) costs will be high because of general mayhem, but political costs (θ_t) will be low as elites will not have enough incentives to side with dissidents rendering the level of defections low. Hence, state elites will not have incentives to side with violent actors and repressive agents will find it justifiable to repress. Thus, I expect that:

Implication 1d: mixed coordinated campaigns will be less likely to succeed than mixed uncoordinated ones.

Of course, there are instances where violent and mixed coordinated campaigns succeed in obtaining concessions from the government, as Wood (2000) shows for the cases of El Salvador and South Africa. In this study, and in line with other scholars (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), I do not argue that a given campaign will never succeed. Instead, that several types of campaigns regarding the use of violence and interaction between moderates and radicals will be more likely to succeed than others. That is, I posit a probabilistic rather than a deterministic argument.

4. The Dynamics of Mixed Campaigns

My argument is that violence works when moderates avoid coordination with radical groups. The previous section regards violence as a dichotomous strategy as other scholars have done. But dissidents can employ high or low levels of violence. By taking a closer look inside the dynamics of mixed campaigns in this section, I propose several conditions under which higher levels of violence can increase the likelihood of success for dissidents. Studying mixed campaigns is useful because it allows to explore implications of the argument that violence works for mixed uncoordinated campaigns but considering violence as a continuous strategy.

4.1 Violence

An implication of Chenoweth and Stephan's (2013) argument, is that if violence were to increase, dissidents would be more likely to fail. Especially, during mixed campaigns, violence should produce a negative flank effect as moderates lose legitimacy (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Schock 2005, 157). But higher levels of violence might work under some conditions through the parameter of costs (c) for rulers. Violence increase human (δ_t) and economic costs (λ_t), undermining rulers' ability to protect populations reducing their levels of support (Thomas 2014) and the general economic activity (E. J. Wood 2001).

This may be risky for dissidents because governments may begin or increase repression campaigns. I thus suggest that the effectiveness of escalating violence will depend on the type of mixed campaign. In mixed uncoordinated campaigns, the escalation of violence will generate instability which will reduce regime support and, in the same way as I suggested above, will increase support for moderate groups. Consequently, this will raise the costs of rulers for not giving in much more than in coordinated campaigns. More violence will cause property damage and destruction, increasing the economic costs as well. The presence of moderates committed with non-violence will help adding economic costs through strikes and protests, but they will also produce political costs (θ_t) through more regime defections. In addition, as moderates do not coordinate with radicals, they will give assurances to rulers about safety, positions of power,

and no spoilers $(\xi_{t+1}, \phi_{t+1}, \alpha_{t+1})$.⁹ In sum, when moderates avoid coordination with radicals and the latter increase the levels of violence, rulers will be more likely to concede. Radicals may not receive spoils, but they will generate a positive externality for moderates.

In contrast, in coordinated campaigns economic costs will be high due to violence, but human and political costs will be lower as people will not find credible moderate factions to support and regime elites will have less incentives to defect. State members will have few incentives to side with protesters if moderates tolerate violent actions. Moreover, dissidents will be more likely considered as a joint group of radicals and thus rulers will not believe the promises of moderates $(-\xi_{t+1}, -\phi_{t+1}, -\alpha_{t+1})$, but will have justifications to repress dissidents. I thus expect that:

Implication 2a: more violence during mixed uncoordinated campaigns will increase the likelihood of success for dissidents, whereas more violence during coordinated campaigns will reduce the likelihood of success for dissidents.

This hypothesis regards the effect of violent actions, but in mixed campaigns both strategies are present. I suggest that when both tactics go together, dissidents will be more likely to succeed. If violent and non-violent tactics increase at the same time, the utility of rulers can reach the highest level. Destruction due to armed attacks along with constant strikes can stop economic activity. Likewise, the constant mayhem will reduce the support for rulers and, if moderates avoid coordination with radicals, they will receive more support causing deeper costs for rulers. Constant demonstrations with millions of protesters can produce regime defections and limit rulers' repressive attempts. The scenario would be one of isolated rulers with the only possibility of stepping down.

If violence surpasses non-violent actions, however, regime elites will have incentives to side with rulers and security agents to agree with repression. Otherwise, their safety and fates will be at risk as well. Participation might go down as radicals start to take the lead reducing the room for moderates. In a similar vein, moderates will not capture much support from the public

⁹ If violence increases, this might signal that radicals are strong enough. However, increasing violence does not necessarily imply that radicals are relatively stronger as they can use tactics that require few recruits such as underground violence, as I detailed below.

as violence is widespread. Moderates will not be credible undermining the likelihood of concessions. Under such conditions, even “bland regime actors” will consider the costs of conceding greater than the costs of repression (O’donnell and Schmitter 1986, 27).

What I expect, then, is that the likelihood of success for dissidents will show an inverted-J relationship over increasing levels of violence. If nonviolence prevails, the likelihood of success will be high, but if both strategies reach similar levels, the likelihood of success will reach the highest levels. Conversely, if violence prevails, the likelihood of dissident success will reach its lowest levels. Given that uncoordinated moderates will always grant positive assurances for rulers, I suggest that uncoordinated campaigns will reach higher levels of success although with the same dynamic of an inverted-J curve. In summary, I expect that:

Implication 2b: when violence and nonviolence reach similar levels of intensity, dissidents will have the highest likelihood of success, although uncoordinated campaigns will be more likely to succeed than coordinated ones.

4.2 Violent Tactics

The latter hypotheses regard violence as a homogenous strategy. However, violence can vary in its repertoires (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017). During dissident campaigns, violence is both a signaling device and an instrument to hurt (Kydd and Walter 2006). I suggest that the type of violent tactics define if radicals show weakness or strength (Bueno de Mesquita 2013), shaping differently the utility of rulers to concede.

I focus on three tactics that radicals commonly use: frontal attacks, riots, and underground attacks. Each one varies in their resource requirements and the amount of costs they cause over rulers’ utility. *Frontal tactics* are those that require groups to have some degree of direct battle contact with security agencies. These tactics require more recruits, specialized logistical planning, and some place to plan attacks collectively such as, but not necessarily, territorial control (Bueno de Mesquita 2013; De La Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2015). They might be not very common given their planning requirements, but each frontal attack generates *high costs* both human and economic. Assassinations of officials or attacks against military facilities are examples of frontal attacks (Carter 2015).

Riots are violent actions although without the use of firearms or heavy weaponry. They only entail property destruction, sabotage, or physical altercations (Case 2018). Burning down public buildings, cars, or business are examples of riots. They need few resources: a couple of protesters can inflict enough damage to call attention with little previous planning. Riots will cause economic costs as property destruction will lower investment and human costs as they will produce public disorder by distracting security agencies during protests (Kadivar and Ketchley 2018; Ketchley 2017). Riots will cause very low impact individually but, given their low planning requirements, they can be frequent. Thus, riots will cause *intermediate costs*.

Finally, *underground attacks* need weaponry but not much organizational resources: radicals need more planning than riots but not as much as a frontal attack, few recruits, and no territorial control (Bueno de Mesquita 2013; De La Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2015).¹⁰ One attack of this type will produce low impact, but as they need more planning than riots, they will be less frequent and will thus produce *low costs*. Table 1 summarizes these arguments.

Table 1. Violent Tactics: Requirements and Impacts

Tactic	Requirements	Impact (one event)	Frequency	Costs (δ_t, λ_t)
<i>Frontal</i>	Many	High	Low	High
<i>Riots</i>	Very Few	Very Low	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium</i>
<i>Underground</i>	Few	Low	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>

Source: own elaboration.

Increases in each tactic, then, produces different amount of costs for rulers' utility. Concretely, I expect that the effect of frontal attacks on the likelihood of success will be the greatest over other tactics, riots will have an intermediate effect, whereas underground attacks will have the lowest effect. However, I suggest that uncoordinated campaigns will always have a higher likelihood of success although the relationship across violent tactics will be the same for both campaigns. To recall, uncoordinated campaigns generate higher costs for rulers because moderates acquire more support given radical violence. Likewise, uncoordinated campaigns give assurance to rulers, whereas coordinated campaigns do not; I thus expect that:

¹⁰ In these type of conflicts, armed groups are not very likely to hold territorial control. However, not all groups use underground tactics as the theory of De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2015) predict.

Implication 3a: both uncoordinated and coordinated campaigns will have the highest increase in their likelihood of success if frontal attacks increase, an intermediate one if riots increase, and the smallest one if underground attacks increase.

Implication 3b: between coordinated and uncoordinated campaigns, uncoordinated ones will always be more likely to succeed if any violent tactic increases.

4.3 Violence and Fragmentation

Levels of violence may shape success rates of mixed campaigns, but it is also important to consider that this type of campaigns entail internal competition by nature (della Porta 1995; della Porta and Tarrow 1986). They involve many organizations with different interests which is important to consider for the effects of violence on the success of dissidents. Competitive settings may increase internal fighting, weaken the whole movement, and lower dissidents' likelihood of success (Krause 2014). However, more organizations might increase the likelihood of concessions because rulers can divide the movement and concede by co-opting moderate organizations (Cunningham 2011).

What happens when the number of organizations increase as well as the levels of violence conducted by radical groups? I suggest that *under conditions of raising violence*, more dissident organizations will increase the likelihood of success for mixed uncoordinated campaigns but will reduce such a likelihood for coordinated campaigns.

Rulers' utility will increase if dissidents can credibly offer future positions of power (ϕ_{t+1}), but such promises will depend on rulers' ability to co-opt groups from the campaign. Following Tsebelis' (1995) model, each actor in a bargaining situation—in this case dissidents and rulers—have an ideal point about two issues.¹¹ The set of acceptable agreements different from the status quo have a circular form and the ideal point of each actor is at the center of such circles. When bargaining actors have close ideal points, the likelihood of changing the status quo is higher as the set of each actor's acceptable agreements—or each actor's circles—will

¹¹ I do not expect differences depending on the number of issues on the negotiating table; in fact, my argument is general to any amount of issues. I mention two issues to stick to Tsebelis' model.

overlap.¹² If the number of dissident groups increases, I argue, rulers will be more likely to find organizations closer to their ideal points. Given that such organizations have closer ideal points with the ruler, they will be more prone to co-optation. That is, as their set of acceptable agreements will overlap with those of rulers, they will be more willing to accept fewer concessions from the ruler in exchange to giving rulers spoils as future positions of power.¹³

These new organizations might be credible on their promises because, with such potential agreements, they will be better off than continuing the conflict. However, as rulers might face negative fates (e.g. imprisonment), their set of acceptable agreements is very narrow. The *conditions of raising violence* will increase rulers' set of acceptable agreements through the parameter of costs, but not enough to concede. And, even when more organizations are closer to rulers' ideal point, the latter might still renege to concede given rulers' and dissidents' do not reach overlapping bargaining areas. To concede, then, rulers would need to increase their set of agreements. Tsebelis (1995) argues that when bargaining actors increase such a set, the status quo is more likely to change as the amount of acceptable agreements between players increase.

I argue that such changes in the size of rulers' set of agreements will increase if moderates avoid coordination with radicals. In terms of my framework, *under conditions of raising violence*, when the number of organizations in the campaign increases and moderates do not coordinate with radicals, they will be more likely to concede. Rulers can be certain that new moderate organizations will remain as such, avoiding killing rulers or turning radical, otherwise they would lose the popular support they already have. Hence, such organizations will be credible to offer future positions of power. This will increase rulers' set of acceptable agreements and produce overlapping areas of negotiation. More organizations may imply more difficulties for rulers to end mayhem as radicals might continue their operations. However, if rulers can divide the campaigns through co-optation of moderates, and the latter plausibly deny their links with radicals, repressive agents have more room to repress without much reprisals. Moreover, the human costs of violence will also imply that moderates have more support given the unintended effects of radical violence. I thus expect that:

¹² In these cases, the status quo would be the ideal point of rulers.

¹³ Even though all dissident organizations will want the same short-term outcome (secession, regime change, or autonomy), they will want different long-term outcomes setting their ideal points in different positions.

Implication 4a: under conditions of raising violence, more non-violent organizations will increase the likelihood of success for mixed uncoordinated campaigns.

In contrast, under conditions of raising violence, coordinated campaigns with more organizations will be less likely to succeed. Rulers will perceive the threat of radicals is increasing even though new moderate organizations emerge. Even with closer ideal points, such new organizations will not be credible in their promises as rulers will infer they are new radical groups. Hence, rulers will reduce their set of agreements making concessions less likely:

Implication 4b: under conditions of raising violence more dissident organizations will decrease the likelihood of success for mixed coordinated campaigns.

5. Data and Research Design

To test my hypotheses, I built a database at the campaign-year level from the Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 2.1 (NAVCO) database (Chenoweth and Shay 2019) for the period of 1955 to 2013.¹⁴ A campaign is “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth and Shay 2019). The tactics must be extra-institutional, i.e. methods not allowed by state institutions, and must be directed towards challenging the authority of the current regime. These campaigns last from days to years, rather than being sporadic events; and they have discernable leadership and names. I restricted the sample to only include campaigns seeking maximalist goals such as regime change, secession, autonomy, and anti-occupation.

¹⁴ Although NAVCO covers the period from 1946 to 2013, the CNTS data I have access to only covers 1955 to 2013.

5.1 *Dependent Variable*

To measure the *dependent variable*, I re-coded the success variable in NAVCO. For the first pool of implications about all campaign types, I built 4 variables. I used the variable of progress in NAVCO to identify four stages of success. The progress variable identifies if the campaign, related to its stated goals (regime change, secession, autonomy, anti-occupation), reached any of the following stages: (1) failure, (2) status quo, (3) visible gains, (4) limited concessions, (5) significant concessions, or (6) complete success.

I codified if the campaign achieved *at least* one of the categories related with success. For instance, the first category of success is equal to 1 if the campaign achieved at least visible gains, category (3), and equal to 0 if the campaign stayed in status quo or failed. I followed this procedure subsequently up to the complete success category, always considering success equal to 0 if the campaign stayed in the status quo or failed. From the pool of all campaigns, 5% have achieved complete success, 13% at least significant concessions, 18% at least limited concessions, and 26% at least visible gains.

For the pool of implications about mixed campaigns I took the limited concessions stage to measure—category (4). Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) suggest codifying success as “strategic” collapsing the category of complete success and significant concessions. However, I included the limited concessions category as my arguments speak to rulers’ *decisions to concede*. I thus try to capture instances where moderates achieve concessions but not radicals.¹⁵ I exclude visible gains because, at that level, rulers do not make formal of public concessions (Chenoweth and Shay 2019, 26).

5.2 *Independent Variables: Campaign Type*

The main independent variable is the *type of campaign*: violent, mixed coordinated, mixed uncoordinated, and non-violent. Chenoweth and Shay (2019) classify campaigns as violent or non-violent depending on the “primary method” used by dissidents. Non-violent campaigns are

¹⁵ If I was to consider only higher categories of success, it was more likely that radical groups may end up benefitted with the outcome not because of their actions but because of the nature of the outcome as a public good.

those where dissidents use methods that do not threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent. Campaigns are violent when dissidents use force to physically harm the opponent.

To identify the types of campaigns, I included the number of *violent and politically motivated attacks* registered in the same country and year where the campaign occurred with data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Cross National Time Series data (CNTS) database (Banks and Wilson 2013; LaFree and Dugan 2007).¹⁶ The GTD database registers violent events where there was evidence of the “threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” The CNTS database includes the number of different conflict-related events by country and year, but I only included assassinations, terrorism/guerrilla warfare, and riots.¹⁷ It was not possible to identify if the authors of these attacks were directly linked with the maximalist campaign. However, given that I am analyzing maximalist campaigns that engage in open conflicts with rulers, it is very likely that these events will be linked to such campaigns. Moreover, it is also very likely that, while facing a dissident campaign, rulers will consider any conflictive action linked to such campaign.

I summed up all these events by country and year, matched these data with the database of campaign-years, to then distinguish between violent, non-violent, and mixed campaigns. To do so, I used the GTD for the period from 1970 to 2006 and the CNTS dataset for 1955 to 1969.¹⁸ Non-violent campaign-years in NAVCO with less than 2 violent events remained as *non-violent*.

I classified a campaign as *mixed* if non-violent campaign-years identified in NAVCO satisfied at least one of the following criteria:

- The campaign had more than 1 violent event in the GTD (1970-2013) or the (CNTS) (1955-1969).
- The campaign shifted from non-violent to violent tactics, or vice-versa as registered in NAVCO. The main reason to do so was because in de-escalation or escalation years both violent and non-violent actors maintain their activities. E.g. Algeria (1992), El Salvador (1979) (Martinez 2000; E. J. Wood 2000).

¹⁶ Data for the GTD comes from media articles in English and other languages. For more details see LaFree and Dugan (2007). The CNTS dataset includes events of violence coded from newspapers, mainly the New York Times.

¹⁷ In Appendix 5 I included more details about the selection of events from each database.

¹⁸ For all models, I conducted robustness tests for the period after 1969 to assess the validity of my results.

- The campaign had a violent flank as registered in NAVCO.¹⁹

I then distinguished if moderates tolerated radicals or they maintained their non-violent discipline. To do so, *mixed coordinated campaigns* were those mixed campaigns that had a radical flank and non-violent groups signaled clear toleration of the radical flank, as coded in NAVCO 2.1. Examples of these campaigns: the anti-apartheid in South Africa (1983-1994), the anti-military campaign in El Salvador (1979-1980), and the independence campaign in Algeria (1950). In contrast, *mixed uncoordinated campaigns* were those that either: i) had no radical flank, ii) had a flank but non-violent groups signaled commitment to non-violent discipline, iii) or had a flank but non-violent groups had internal disagreement to tolerate it.²⁰ Examples of these campaigns: the anti-PRI campaign in Mexico (1986-2000), Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2001-2002), the Egyptian Anti-Mubarak campaign (2007-2011), and the FIS anti-military campaign in Algeria (1989-1992). *Violent campaigns* were those that were classified as such in the NAVCO 2.1 or the subsequent years of mixed campaigns that were classified as violent.²¹

Table 2. Distribution of Campaign-Years by Type

Type of Campaign	Percent of All Campaigns	Percent of Non-violent Campaigns
<i>Violent</i>	86 (2101)	-
<i>Mixed Coordinated</i>	2 (60)	18 (60)
<i>Mixed Uncoordinated</i>	8 (190)	54 (190)
<i>Non-violent</i>	4 (99)	28 (99)

Source: own elaboration. Note: total observations in parentheses.

Column 2 of Table 1 shows that, from the pool of observations in NAVCO, the majority experienced some degree of violence during those years: non-violent campaign-years represent only 4% of the sample. Column 3 shows that almost 80% of non-violent campaigns were campaigns with some degree of organized violence.

¹⁹ Consequently, if a campaign failed to satisfy *all three* of these criteria it falls into the *non-violent* category.

²⁰ The last category might be ambiguous to whether such campaigns coordinate or not with radicals. However, the important point is that moderates are not signaling commitment with radicals, making them more credible. Besides, they comprise the less frequent category: 10% of observations in the whole data.

²¹ Violent conflicts are essentially civil wars (Chenoweth and Shay 2019; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

5.3 Independent Variables: Violent Tactics

To measure violent and non-violent tactics, I used the number of violent events from the GTD and the CNTS. The *attacks* variable is the sum of guerrilla/terrorism, assassinations, and riots events of the CNTS for years 1955-1969, and it is the sum of all violent attacks of the GTD for years 1970-2013. The *frontal attacks* variable is the sum of the number of attacks against facilities, armed assaults, and assassinations of the GTD and the number of assassinations of the CNTS. *Underground attacks* variable the sum of bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings of the GTD, and of guerrilla/terrorism events from the CNTS. Finally, the variable *rate of violence* is the rate of riots, guerrilla/terrorism, and assassinations events divided by all violent and non-violent events (strikes and demonstrations). For this variable, I relied only on the information of the CNTS to include a single codifying criterion.

5.4 Independent Variables: Fragmentation

To measure fragmentation, I relied on the variable of NAVCO of how many new organizations enter the campaign each year. The variable goes from 0 new organizations up to 11 or more new organizations either violent or non-violent.²² This measure may not capture the whole range of organizations in the campaign, but I use it as proxy for the number of involved groups.

5.5 Control Variables

I identified control variables that may shape both the success of dissidents and their strategies. I control for *state capacity* with the natural log of the GDP per capita (Bolt et al. 2018) and for the *size* of the campaign.²³ For the latter, I used the categorical estimate of the number of participants of each campaign in NAVCO.²⁴ Belgioioso et al. (2019) suggest that campaigns

²² Communication with Erica Chenoweth.

²³ According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2013), the number of people involved mostly determines the success of campaigns since it motivates defections from regime members and reduce the likelihood of repression, making the regime more vulnerable.

²⁴ The measure is not very accurate, however. By its very nature, the variable is hard to code. In the NAVCO codebook Chenoweth and Shay (2019) state that they collect the information mostly from "peak events" and secondary estimates. The problem with the former issue is that it is hard to know if the presence of peak events signals the last moments of the regimes and also explain the number of protesters, or if, in fact, these events signal a good estimate of the number of participants during the whole movement. In other words, the variable could be

with hierarchical leadership raise the odds of success for dissidents under conditions of violence; thus, I control with a dummy variable if the leadership of the campaign was hierarchical or not with data from NAVCO. I also included *repression levels* from NAVCO. The measure is a categorical variable from 0 to 3 that identifies if in that year there was low or extreme repression from the state. I control for the level of *judicial constraints* on the executive of the target country with data from the V-Dem Project, for the period of the *Cold War*, and for the *type of regime* (democracy or autocracy) of the target government (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010).

5.6 *The Empirical Strategy*

I used panel logit models as the dataset is at the conflict-year level and because of the binary nature of the dependent variables. In all models estimated models with random effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity of each campaign and maintain variables that have little changes over time. I also clustered the error terms by campaign to relax the homoskedasticity assumption of the model and calculate robust standard errors.

6. Results

6.1 *Success Across Campaigns*

Table 3 shows the results for the models testing the first pool of empirical implications. The core independent variable is the type of campaign and the category of reference are violent campaigns. Implication 1c suggests that mixed uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed than their violent counterparts. I find support for this expectation: across success categories, mixed uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed than violent ones and this result is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).²⁵ Implication 1d suggests that coordinated

measuring the success of the campaign, rather than estimating a realistic number of participants, what, in turn, would explain the high degree of correlation in the models. Nonetheless, I use it because I lack a better alternative.
²⁵ Here, I cannot distinguish if concessions were for radicals, moderates, or both. Given radicals are isolated, however, it is plausible to think that moderates were the ones achieving concessions.

campaigns will be less likely to succeed than uncoordinated ones. This seems to be the case: across all models the coefficients for coordinated campaigns are lower.

Table 3. Logistic Regressions of Success Across Campaigns

	(1) At Least Visible Gains	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Significant Concessions	(4) Complete Success
Mixed Coordinated	0.748** (0.381)	0.283 (0.453)	-1.046 (0.712)	-0.083 (0.915)
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.232*** (0.417)	1.210*** (0.428)	1.121** (0.486)	1.695*** (0.534)
Non-violent	0.981** (0.489)	1.461**** (0.444)	1.197** (0.525)	1.829** (0.736)
Hierarchical Leadership	0.102 (0.260)	-0.369 (0.281)	-0.188 (0.327)	0.802* (0.430)
Campaign Size	0.580**** (0.103)	0.628**** (0.101)	0.759**** (0.129)	0.852**** (0.227)
Repression Levels	0.006 (0.178)	0.070 (0.188)	-0.066 (0.195)	-0.266 (0.217)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.055 (0.124)	-0.047 (0.138)	-0.018 (0.162)	0.101 (0.210)
Judicial Constraints	0.928* (0.541)	1.060* (0.604)	-0.479 (0.686)	0.154 (1.030)
Cold War	-0.468** (0.206)	-0.468** (0.234)	-0.463* (0.276)	-0.480 (0.404)
Democracy	-0.633** (0.253)	-0.515** (0.259)	-0.046 (0.367)	0.171 (0.525)
Constant	-1.842 (1.215)	-2.652** (1.322)	-2.928* (1.558)	-5.858*** (2.034)
Observations	1847	1847	1847	1847
Campaigns	238	238	238	238
Log likelihood	-874.872	-695.103	-533.790	-258.295
Chi-squared	88.862	88.980	82.085	63.953
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000


Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Source: own elaboration.

To compare the likelihood of success across all campaigns and to assess implications 1a and 1b, I show in Figure 1 the expected probabilities of success for each type of campaign holding the rest of the covariates at their means and regime constant for autocracies with the model of Column 2. The figure shows that non-violent campaigns are the most likely ones to succeed whereas violent campaigns the least likely to succeed, consistent with implications 1a and 1b and with previous research (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This further suggests that when moderates prevail, rulers have more incentives to concede as they have assurances; but when radicals prevail, the lack of assurances undermines the likelihood of concessions.

Figure 1. Expected Probabilities of Success



Source: own elaboration. Note: 90% Confidence intervals.

These estimates also show further support for implication 1d as mixed coordinated campaigns are less likely to succeed than uncoordinated campaigns, although not more likely to do so than violent ones. Further, the results suggest that mixed uncoordinated campaigns are both more likely to succeed than violent campaigns and *as likely* to do so as non-violent campaigns. That is, even if violence is not effective by itself, when it is combined with non-violent actions, it raises the odds of success for dissidents, contrary to what other scholars expected (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

6.2 Success Across Mixed Campaigns: Violence

Implication 2a suggested that violence should be harmful for coordinated campaigns but beneficial for uncoordinated ones. Implication 2b suggested that, considering the joint production of violence and nonviolence, the effect of violence should be nonlinear in an inverted-J form. Table 3 shows the tests for these implications. As I am interested in differences on the use of tactics across both types of campaigns, I used interaction terms. The reference category is always coordinated campaigns. Column 1 shows that when violence increases, uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed, although the effects are not significant.

Column 2 shows that considering the joint production of violence and nonviolence by dissidents the effect of violence is negative in the quadratic term as expected ($p < 0.05$).

Table 4. Logistic Regressions of the Effect of Violence on the Success of Mixed Campaigns

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	0.716 (0.810)	-1.676 (1.751)
Attacks	0.006 (0.005)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	0.001 (0.006)	
Rate of Violence		-11.640** (4.790)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence		16.801** (6.557)
Rate of Violence ²		10.540** (5.076)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence ²		-15.517** (6.525)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.088* (0.577)	-1.078 (0.675)
Campaign Size	0.471*** (0.169)	0.501** (0.197)
Repression Levels	-0.290 (0.304)	-0.425 (0.414)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.358 (0.413)	-0.316 (0.429)
Judicial Constraints	-1.786 (1.275)	-0.626 (1.764)
Cold War	-1.082* (0.602)	-1.031 (0.673)
Democracy	0.395 (0.710)	-0.008 (0.673)
Constant	2.981 (3.855)	4.258 (4.318)
Observations	128	133
Campaigns	58	64
Log likelihood	-76.369	-76.272
Chi-squared	17.532	14.432
p	0.063	0.274

Standard errors in parentheses


* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$

Source: own elaboration.

However, to better analyze the effect of interaction terms is better to calculate and plot marginal effects to evaluate if the effects hold for the majority of observations (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). In addition, to analyze if the relationship really has an inverted-J form for both campaign types, Figure 3 plots the expected probabilities of success for each campaign

type when the rate of violence increases.²⁶ The result suggests that the relationship is not an inverted-J but an inverted-U one and limited to uncoordinated campaigns. Going from 0 violent attacks (5th percentile) up to 53% in the rate of violence, where are almost 75% of the observations,²⁷ the likelihood of success for an uncoordinated campaign changes in 100 percentage points (from 30% to 61%). Beyond this point, the likelihood of success starts to dwindle.

Figure 2. Expected Probabilities of the Non-linear Effect of Violence



Source: own elaboration. Note: 90% confidence intervals.

Interestingly, coordinated campaigns have the opposite relationship although it is not significant across the rate of violence. Yet, this supports my argument because the graph suggests that when moderates coordinate with radicals, the use of violence or nonviolence turns irrelevant for dissident success. That is, violence may not affect success but the coordination between both groups already puts these campaigns in a disadvantageous starting point.

²⁶ These and all subsequent calculations of marginal effects consider covariates at their means, regime type constant for autocratic regimes, and the Cold War as observed.

²⁷ Histograms in the graphs for more clarity.

6.3 Success Across Mixed Campaigns: Violent Tactics

With Implication 3a, I suggested that increases of different violent tactics will produce different effects in the likelihood of success for both campaigns. Frontal attacks should have the highest impact, riots an intermediate impact, and underground attacks the lowest impact. Implication 3b suggest that this relationship will hold for both campaigns but that uncoordinated campaigns will always have a higher likelihood of success than coordinated ones. Table 4 shows the results for comparisons across violent tactics and campaign types. Consistent with my argument, in contrast with coordinated campaigns, more frontal attacks and more riots make uncoordinated campaigns more likely to succeed. However, the estimate for underground attacks is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

To better test Implications 3a and 3b, I calculated the expected probabilities of going from the 5th up to the 95th percentile in the amount of each type of attack for both campaigns and plotted these calculations in Figure 4. Panel A shows strong support for my argument. Going from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile in frontal attacks, the likelihood of success for uncoordinated campaigns changes in 172 percentage points (from 36% to 98%). Interestingly, with the same changes, coordinated campaigns are also more likely to succeed, although these changes are not significant, but significantly less likely than uncoordinated campaigns.

Table 5. Logistic Regressions of Violent Tactics

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	0.342 (0.690)	-0.103 (0.827)	0.865 (0.876)
Frontal Attacks	0.008 (0.008)		
Mixed Uncoordinated * Frontal Attacks	0.034* (0.018)		
Riots		-0.417** (0.179)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Riots		0.450** (0.190)	
Underground Attacks			0.011 (0.011)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Underground Attacks			-0.008 (0.010)
Hierarchical Leadership	-0.944 (0.577)	-1.057* (0.603)	-1.164* (0.612)
Campaign Size	0.462** (0.181)	0.466*** (0.162)	0.450*** (0.173)
Repression Levels	-0.278 (0.325)	-0.414 (0.347)	-0.313 (0.320)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.385 (0.396)	-0.194 (0.388)	-0.342 (0.374)
Judicial Constraints	-2.115* (1.240)	-0.808 (1.404)	-1.622 (1.358)
Cold War	-0.920* (0.544)	-0.768 (0.622)	-1.106 (0.733)
Democracy	0.466 (0.721)	0.326 (0.598)	0.441 (0.649)
Constant	3.364 (3.679)	2.262 (3.640)	2.904 (3.634)
Observations	128	150	128
Campaigns	58	66	58
Log likelihood	-72.857	-87.618	-77.600
Chi-squared	18.428	14.914	15.395
p	0.048	0.135	0.118

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001


Source: own elaboration.

Panel B and C show a different picture from my argument. Riots seem to increase the likelihood of success for uncoordinated campaigns by only 15 percentage points. However, the same tactic generally harms coordinated campaigns, although the effect is only significantly different from zero in the ranges from the 5th up to the 75th percentile in the number of riots (0 to 3). Increases in underground attacks, in contrast, generally increase the likelihood of success of likelihood for dissidents regardless of the campaign type. Yet, the magnitude of such changes is different. Going from the 5th to the 95th percentile in the amount of underground attacks


changes the likelihood of success by 20 percentage points for uncoordinated campaigns, but by 100 percentage points for coordinated ones.

Figure 3. Expected Probabilities of Success Over Violent Tactics


Panel A. Frontal Attacks



Panel B. Riots



Panel C. Underground Attacks



Source: own elaboration. Note: 90% confidence intervals

In summary, riots have the lowest impact on both campaigns and even harm coordinated ones. Frontal attacks, in contrast, benefit uncoordinated campaigns whereas underground tactics benefit coordinated campaigns.

6.4 Success Across Mixed Campaigns: Violence and Fragmentation

In Table 5, I report the tests for Implications 4a and 4b. As Column 1 shows, when both violence and the number of organizations increase, the likelihood of success for uncoordinated campaigns

also increase. Figure 6 shows how expected probabilities change across violence and the number of groups.

Table 6. Logistic Regressions of Organizations and Violence

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.452 (1.025)
New Organizations	0.314** (0.134)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations	-0.244* (0.141)
Attacks	0.015* (0.008)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	-0.009 (0.008)
New Organizations * Attacks	-0.007* (0.004)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations * Attacks	0.008* (0.004)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.285** (0.635)
Campaign Size	0.445** (0.200)
Repression Levels	-0.307 (0.341)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.299 (0.416)
Judicial Constraints	-2.221* (1.316)
Cold War	-1.310* (0.756)
Democracy	0.399 (0.802)
Constant	1.954 (3.903)
Observations	128
Campaigns	58
Log likelihood	-73.827
Chi-squared	17.793
p	0.216

Standard errors in parentheses


* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Source: own elaboration.

As the graph shows, if violence and the number of dissident organizations increase simultaneously, mixed coordinated campaigns are less likely to succeed. When a coordinated campaign goes from the 5th to the 95th percentile in the number of attacks and there are 0 new organizations (5th percentile of new organizations), their likelihood of success increases by 135 percentage points. With the same conditions, the likelihood of success for an uncoordinated

campaign increases by 37 percentage points. However, with 3 additional organizations (75th percentile of new organizations) and with the same changes in the levels of violence, a *coordinated* campaign *reduces* its likelihood of success by 65 percentage points whereas an *uncoordinated* campaign *increases* it by 69 percentage points.

Figure 4. Expected Probabilities Across Campaigns Over Violence and Organizations



Source: own elaboration. Note: 90% confidence intervals.

This suggest that, in support of my argument, under conditions of raising violence, additional organizations benefit uncoordinated campaigns, but harm coordinated ones. To put it simply, if radicals increase violence, there are more new organizations, and moderates do not coordinate with radicals, rulers will have more incentives to concede as they will try to reduce the costs they are facing seeking from a broader menu of options the “better devil” they need (Belgioioso, Costalli, and Gleditsch 2019).

6.5 Robustness Checks

I ran several robustness tests to assess the validity of the findings. First, repression is an important variable as it can shape the strategies of dissidents and the willingness of rulers to concede (Lichbach 1987; Beissinger 2004). The repression variable from NAVCO may seem dubious as it collapses repression levels under only three categories. I thus used the Political Terror Scale (PTS) which considers a broader categorization of 5 levels of state repression (R. M. Wood and Gibney 2010). This does not change the results substantially.

Second, I only used the sample of the GTD to assess if the effects are not due to different coding criteria, but the results remain the same, except for the effects of frontal attacks and campaign fragmentation. Both coefficients show the expected sign but lose statistical significance, although this might happen due to the loss of observations.

Third, I included linear time trend given that at the end of the cycles of protests violence is more likely, rulers might be more willing to concede (della Porta and Tarrow 1986; De La Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, n.d.; Belgioioso 2018), and to control for the fact that the campaign size may increase just because of participation cascades (Lohmann 1994). Including this variable, however, does not change results substantially although it affects the effect of non-violent campaigns on the rates of complete success.

Finally, I included the number of years a campaign has been violent. Mixed campaigns can be originated by previous periods of violent campaigns, that is they may de-escalate.²⁸ Therefore, mixed campaigns coming from periods of higher violence may imply very different settings, for instance, of more powerful radical groups than mixed campaigns that never experienced escalation. When I include this variable, results remain equal.

²⁸ I do not make separate tests for mixed campaigns that escalate into civil wars because they are considered as failures.

7. Conclusions

In this study, I analyzed the conditions under which the use of violence helps dissidents succeed. I found how factors such as the interaction between moderates and radicals, the character of violence, and, most importantly, the assurances for rulers, are crucial to understand the success of dissident campaigns. Scholars of contentious politics and political violence focus on how dissidents impose costs on rulers to make them concede. Following this logic, some scholars have found that non-violent methods succeed more often (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008; 2011).

My study points out, however, that violence works under a general condition: when moderates do not coordinate with radical groups. Through violence, radicals can directly increase the costs for rulers; and, indirectly produce a positive externality for moderates as they increase their popular support. Under these conditions is when a *radical flank effect* can be positive (Haines 1984). The study, however, also points out that this is not enough. By reframing the problem of concessions as one linked to rulers' utility and to the credibility of moderate factions, the study shows that moderates must plausibly deny their links and avoid coordination with radicals to be credible bargaining actors.

This suggests that it is important to reconsider the incentives of the actors who make concessions to understand the effects of the actors who pressure them, in this case dissident groups, and how credible they are. In the end, if multiple actors want to establish agreements, they need to be credible to each other (North and Weingast 1989; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994). Likewise, these findings suggest that the mechanisms through which violence works might be varied. Many scholars suggest it might work directly through the costs it imposes on rulers (Thomas 2014; Pape 2003) whereas others suggest it works indirectly increasing support for dissidents (Lake 2002; Carter 2015). The study shows both effects can be simultaneous, although the indirect effect works mainly because moderates are present.

I also find that, conditional on the lack of coordination, there are three conditions that shape if violence helps dissidents succeed. Specifically, violence motivates concessions if it reaches similar levels of intensity along with non-violent, if the nature of violence is frontal, and if there are more dissident organizations. These findings suggest that it is not only important to analyze the cycles of protest to understand the dynamics of violence and its effects (della Porta 1995; della Porta and Tarrow 1986; De La Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, n.d.), but also to consider

its character and the internal dynamics of dissident groups. Further research might explore the role of international actors and diffusion effects of these intervening factors.

Finally, an important conclusion from this research points out to optimistic normative horizons. Violence by itself might not work as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found. It certainly works under some identifiable conditions as I found, yet they seem to be restrictive. Moreover, the research suggests that in public policy terms, civil society organizations have better chances to acquire concessions by fostering moderate positions rather than otherwise.

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Appendix

Appendix 1. Alternative Repression Measure

All the models in the manuscript included a measure of repression from NAVCO. Repression is a crucial variable defining the use of violence by dissident groups and the probability of rulers conceding to dissidents (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Beissinger 2004). As such, I included a different measure of repression from the Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney 2010). The advantage of this measure is that it has a broader range of levels of repression and it relies on sources that systematically monitor human rights abuses inside countries. The following tables show the results of including this measure for all the models in the manuscript.

Table A1.1 All Campaigns

	(1) At Least Visible Gains	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Significant Concessions	(4) Complete Success
Mixed Coordinated	0.670 (0.476)	0.221 (0.576)	-1.053 (0.935)	1.354 (1.025)
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.733**** (0.465)	1.745**** (0.528)	1.473** (0.595)	2.713**** (0.679)
Non-violent	1.557*** (0.602)	2.040*** (0.645)	1.598** (0.698)	2.736**** (0.819)
Hierarchical Leadership	0.132 (0.305)	-0.450 (0.342)	-0.281 (0.368)	0.821 (0.549)
Campaign Size	0.658**** (0.145)	0.646**** (0.146)	0.895**** (0.196)	0.868*** (0.329)
PTS Repression	0.106 (0.157)	0.102 (0.208)	-0.168 (0.259)	-0.283 (0.262)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.273 (0.173)	-0.295 (0.201)	-0.383 (0.236)	-0.407 (0.319)
Judicial Constraints	0.575 (0.729)	0.296 (0.886)	-1.437 (0.918)	-2.164* (1.275)
Cold War	-0.437* (0.243)	-0.599** (0.288)	-0.798** (0.351)	-1.180* (0.687)
Democracy	-0.438 (0.280)	-0.205 (0.314)	0.067 (0.389)	0.882 (0.631)
Constant	-0.778 (1.481)	-0.869 (1.807)	0.368 (2.108)	-1.398 (2.975)
Observations	1354	1354	1354	1354
Log likelihood	-617.516	-483.445	-360.351	-163.153
Chi-squared	80.144	71.432	71.051	41.745
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001


Table A1.2 Mixed Campaigns and Violence

	(1) At Least Significant Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.776** (0.853)	0.584 (2.254)
Attacks	0.002 (0.005)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	0.000 (0.006)	
Rate of Violence		33.919 (22.812)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence		-26.883 (21.092)
Rate of Violence ²		-83.143* (49.399)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence ²		76.971 (47.786)
Hierarchical Leadership	-0.780 (0.839)	-0.994 (0.948)
Campaign Size	0.599*** (0.210)	0.374 (0.274)
PTS Repression	-0.206 (0.322)	0.129 (0.564)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.464 (0.297)	-0.737 (0.766)
Judicial Constraints	-3.183* (1.776)	-0.812 (2.493)
Cold War	-1.222* (0.687)	-0.484 (1.076)
Democracy	0.730 (0.754)	0.713 (1.236)
Constant	2.590 (2.629)	3.978 (6.762)
Observations	116	120
Log likelihood	-62.313	-65.099
Chi-squared	16.349	9.494
_p	0.090	0.660

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Figure A2.1 Expected Probabilities of the Nonlinear Effect of Violence



Column 2 in Table A2 provides the results for the impact of the nonlinear effect of the rate of violence on the success of mixed campaigns. The coefficient is not significant, but evaluating interactive effects just by its significance might be misleading (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). As Figure A2 shows, the relationship I suggested with Implication 2b holds as uncoordinated campaigns are more likely to succeed when both violence and nonviolence reach similar levels. The figure shows that from 0 to 39% of violent attacks the difference with coordinated campaigns is not substantial, but from 40% of attacks and onwards, the differences between campaigns are significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.05$). Between these ranges, is where most observations are located as the histogram below shows.

Table A1.3. Violent Tactics

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.266 (1.101)	0.972 (1.034)	2.166 (1.358)
Frontal Attacks	0.014 (0.009)		
Mixed Uncoordinated * Frontal Attacks	0.021 (0.018)		
Riots		-0.414** (0.169)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Riots		0.494*** (0.190)	
Underground Attacks			0.016 (0.014)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Underground Attacks			-0.016 (0.015)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.037 (0.718)	-0.874 (0.717)	-1.176 (0.782)
Campaign Size	0.527** (0.262)	0.382* (0.195)	0.439** (0.207)
PTS Repression	0.050 (0.389)	0.430 (0.436)	0.262 (0.389)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.494 (0.629)	-0.205 (0.463)	-0.402 (0.422)
Judicial Constraints	-2.195 (1.607)	-0.465 (1.790)	-1.452 (1.868)
Cold War	-0.710 (0.633)	-0.264 (0.797)	-0.725 (0.869)
Democracy	0.456 (1.335)	0.547 (0.725)	0.621 (0.828)
Constant	2.464 (4.284)	-1.286 (4.453)	0.415 (3.611)
Observations	116	136	116
Log likelihood	-65.197	-78.678	-68.936
Chi-squared	19.168	11.731	13.107
p	0.038	0.303	0.218

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Table A1.4 Violence and Fragmentation

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	2.424 (2.002)
New Organizations	0.276** (0.129)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations	-0.157 (0.301)
Attacks	0.019 (0.013)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	-0.012 (0.010)
New Organizations * Attacks	-0.006** (0.002)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations * Attacks	0.005 (0.003)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.347* (0.750)
Campaign Size	0.501 (0.397)
PTS Repression	0.031 (0.479)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.468 (0.820)
Judicial Constraints	-1.994 (1.775)
Cold War	-0.996 (0.819)
Democracy	0.432 (1.942)
Constant	1.273 (5.237)
Observations	116
Log likelihood	-66.056
Chi-squared	16.983
p	0.257

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Appendix 2. GTD period

To select mixed campaigns, I relied on the CNTS for the period 1955-1969 and on the GTD for the period 1970-2013. However, the heterogeneity in the coding may bias the results. To get rid of this problem I estimated all the models only with the GTD data. I tried to run the models with the CNTS but due to the very low number of observations the maximum likelihood estimation did not converged. I recognize the problems associated with the lack of this second proof, but I had no alternative. All results remain equal as in the manuscript.

Table A2.1. All Campaigns

	(1) At Least Visible Gains	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Significant Concessions	(4) Complete Success
Mixed Coordinated	0.783** (0.392)	0.301 (0.481)	-0.817 (0.742)	0.390 (1.007)
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.625**** (0.461)	1.542*** (0.488)	1.503*** (0.568)	2.412**** (0.647)
Non-violent	1.366** (0.562)	1.735*** (0.573)	1.605** (0.642)	2.399*** (0.873)
Hierarchical Leadership	0.184 (0.317)	-0.425 (0.333)	-0.115 (0.365)	1.089** (0.495)
Campaign Size	0.651**** (0.127)	0.679**** (0.125)	0.880**** (0.160)	0.968*** (0.298)
Repression Levels	-0.116 (0.222)	-0.125 (0.231)	-0.191 (0.234)	-0.448* (0.255)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.169 (0.150)	-0.190 (0.164)	-0.202 (0.186)	-0.190 (0.263)
Judicial Constraints	0.590 (0.661)	0.472 (0.771)	-0.981 (0.826)	-0.561 (1.307)
Cold War	-0.511** (0.223)	-0.568** (0.242)	-0.588** (0.298)	-0.629 (0.498)
Democracy	-0.637** (0.274)	-0.474 (0.294)	-0.220 (0.391)	0.369 (0.614)
Constant	-0.710 (1.473)	-0.856 (1.542)	-1.235 (1.736)	-3.545 (2.523)
Observations	1540	1540	1540	1540
Log likelihood	-707.352	-557.742	-422.608	-200.298
Chi-squared	90.474	87.503	86.269	52.529
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001


Table A2.2. Mixed Campaigns and Violence

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.369 (3.341)	-0.849 (1.765)
Attacks	0.007 (0.008)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	-0.003 (0.009)	
Rate of Violence		17.515 (16.693)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence		-11.447 (15.800)
Rate of Violence ²		-52.017 (37.758)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence ²		46.822 (36.691)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.333 (0.836)	-1.221 (0.787)
Campaign Size	0.470 (0.960)	0.474* (0.242)
Repression Levels	-0.232 (1.394)	-0.527 (0.526)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.290 (2.963)	-0.442 (0.588)
Judicial Constraints	-2.379* (1.412)	-1.190 (2.069)
Cold War	-0.849 (1.776)	-0.659 (0.820)
Democracy	0.506 (7.070)	0.412 (0.846)
Constant	1.985 (26.090)	4.794 (5.606)
Observations	121	126
Log likelihood	-71.538	-68.436
Chi-squared	17.813	11.148
p	0.058	0.516

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Figure A2.1 Predicted Probabilities of the Nonlinear Effect of Violence



As in Appendix 1, the relationship holds after calculating the predicted probabilities of success even though the average effect is not significant. Figure A2.1 shows that, above 38% of violent attacks, uncoordinated campaigns are significantly more likely to succeed in contrast with coordinated campaigns. Above these ranges is where most observations fall and where the differences are significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.05$).

Table A2.3 Violent Tactics

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	0.924 (0.706)	0.388 (0.871)	1.520 (1.120)
Frontal Attacks	0.011 (0.009)		
Mixed Uncoordinated * Frontal Attacks	0.024 (0.037)		
Riots		-0.412** (0.189)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Riots		0.515** (0.219)	
Underground Attacks			0.014 (0.011)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Underground Attacks			-0.012 (0.012)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.158* (0.652)	-1.255** (0.630)	-1.388* (0.714)
Campaign Size	0.471 (0.292)	0.416** (0.183)	0.425** (0.202)
Repression Levels	-0.214 (0.564)	-0.412 (0.381)	-0.237 (0.353)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.349 (0.817)	-0.133 (0.427)	-0.247 (0.548)
Judicial Constraints	-2.651 (1.666)	-1.151 (1.534)	-2.228 (1.455)
Cold War	-0.712 (0.698)	-0.475 (0.659)	-0.812 (0.933)
Democracy	0.566 (2.135)	0.467 (0.660)	0.562 (1.197)
Constant	2.644 (7.996)	1.468 (3.873)	1.659 (4.749)
Observations	121	143	121
Log likelihood	-68.658	-82.025	-72.486
Chi-squared	19.155	14.010	15.675
p	0.038	0.173	0.109

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Table A2.4 Violence and Fragmentation

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.607 (1.007)
New Organizations	0.208 (0.130)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations	-0.103 (0.168)
Attacks	0.014* (0.007)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	-0.008 (0.008)
New Organizations * Attacks	-0.005** (0.002)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations * Attacks	0.005 (0.003)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.443** (0.669)
Campaign Size	0.462** (0.191)
Repression Levels	-0.219 (0.282)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.269 (0.331)
Judicial Constraints	-2.297* (1.381)
Cold War	-0.929 (0.608)
Democracy	0.393 (0.518)
Constant	1.365 (2.683)
Observations	121
Log likelihood	-69.926
Chi-squared	18.020
p	0.206

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Appendix 3. Time Trend

Time can shape both the strategies of dissidents and the incentives of rulers to concede. Cycles of protest tend to end in the use of violence either because of a competitive dynamic between dissidents or because of deliberate strategies of leaders to increase pressure on governments (della Porta 1995; De La Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, n.d.; Belgioioso 2018). Protracted campaigns can also incite concessions as rulers might exhaust their resources and elites might be demoralized with the continuation of the conflict (Beissinger 2004). The following results show that including a linear time trend does not change results substantially.

Table A3.1 All Campaigns

	(1) At Least Visible Gains	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Significant Concessions	(4) Complete Success
Mixed Coordinated	0.733* (0.386)	0.270 (0.454)	-1.064 (0.710)	-0.161 (0.844)
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.190*** (0.433)	1.175*** (0.439)	1.068** (0.503)	1.232*** (0.427)
Non-violent	0.921* (0.498)	1.415*** (0.461)	1.135** (0.537)	1.236** (0.539)
Hierarchical Leadership	0.110 (0.256)	-0.363 (0.278)	-0.183 (0.323)	0.654** (0.319)
Campaign Size	0.583**** (0.103)	0.628**** (0.101)	0.757**** (0.129)	0.664**** (0.134)
Repression Levels	0.012 (0.179)	0.074 (0.189)	-0.061 (0.195)	-0.242 (0.171)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.028 (0.130)	-0.025 (0.146)	0.010 (0.168)	0.135 (0.160)
Judicial Constraints	0.898 (0.553)	1.023 (0.630)	-0.527 (0.707)	-0.103 (0.736)
Cold War	-0.546*** (0.191)	-0.527** (0.230)	-0.541** (0.269)	-0.434 (0.270)
Democracy	-0.607** (0.255)	-0.491* (0.270)	-0.018 (0.361)	0.314 (0.412)
Time Trend	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.061*** (0.020)
Constant	-1.980 (1.228)	-2.752** (1.337)	-3.030* (1.563)	-4.766*** (1.482)
Observations	1847	1847	1847	1847
Log likelihood	-874.566	-694.951	-533.558	-255.045
Chi-squared	89.314	89.498	82.667	134.484
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Table A3.2 Mixed Campaigns and Violence

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	0.767 (0.780)	-1.978 (1.850)
Attacks	0.006 (0.005)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	0.000 (0.006)	
Rate of Violence		-13.348** (5.824)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence		19.518** (7.681)
Rate of Violence ²		12.129** (6.019)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence ²		-18.220** (7.558)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.168** (0.584)	-0.938 (0.725)
Campaign Size	0.470*** (0.164)	0.557*** (0.208)
Repression Levels	-0.235 (0.282)	-0.608 (0.505)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.349 (0.295)	-0.418 (0.495)
Judicial Constraints	-1.467 (1.295)	-1.546 (2.034)
Cold War	-1.144** (0.558)	-0.894 (0.725)
Democracy	0.462 (0.496)	-0.123 (0.706)
Time Trend	-0.016 (0.020)	0.071 (0.073)
Constant	2.713 (2.658)	5.577 (5.039)
Observations	128	133
Log likelihood	-76.146	-75.205
Chi-squared	18.414	14.058
p	0.072	0.370

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Figure A3.1 Predicted Probabilities of the Nonlinear Effect of Violence




Table A3.3 Violent Tactics

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	0.376 (0.662)	-0.073 (0.901)	0.894 (0.794)
Frontal Attacks	0.009 (0.008)		
Mixed Uncoordinated * Frontal Attacks	0.033** (0.014)		
Riots		-0.439** (0.185)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Riots		0.481** (0.196)	
Underground Attacks			0.012 (0.010)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Underground Attacks			-0.008 (0.010)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.020* (0.590)	-0.945 (0.645)	-1.207** (0.577)
Campaign Size	0.461** (0.182)	0.487*** (0.164)	0.448*** (0.166)
Repression Levels	-0.237 (0.306)	-0.538 (0.415)	-0.237 (0.284)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.390 (0.298)	-0.271 (0.443)	-0.293 (0.274)
Judicial Constraints	-1.782 (1.339)	-1.331 (1.556)	-1.374 (1.327)
Cold War	-0.984* (0.518)	-0.659 (0.676)	-1.098* (0.587)
Democracy	0.544 (0.496)	0.283 (0.623)	0.431 (0.509)
Time Trend	-0.016 (0.019)	0.040 (0.059)	-0.014 (0.021)
Constant	3.248 (2.641)	3.079 (4.059)	2.268 (2.613)
Observations	128	150	128
Log likelihood	-72.659	-87.150	-77.496
Chi-squared	19.628	14.268	17.217
p	0.051	0.219	0.102

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Table A3. 4 Violence and Fragmentation

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.534 (0.997)
New Organizations	0.301*** (0.111)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations	-0.249* (0.135)
Attacks	0.016** (0.007)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	-0.009 (0.008)
New Organizations * Attacks	-0.007*** (0.002)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations * Attacks	0.007** (0.003)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.322** (0.618)
Campaign Size	0.457*** (0.172)
Repression Levels	-0.234 (0.281)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.284 (0.326)
Judicial Constraints	-1.874 (1.288)
Cold War	-1.305** (0.608)
Democracy	0.391 (0.506)
Time Trend	-0.014 (0.021)
Constant	1.551 (2.724)
Observations	128
Log likelihood	-73.713
Chi-squared	19.750
p	0.182

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Appendix 4. Civil War Years

Mixed campaigns might be processes de-escalate as in the case of the conflict between the IRA and the British government. These campaigns might include strong armed groups that might change the dynamics of the conflict and increase the incentives of rulers to concede as threats of violence are credible. As such, I included a control variable to account for the number of years a campaign has been a civil war. Results remain the same.

Table A4.1 Mixed Campaigns and Violence

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	0.802 (0.783)	-1.709 (1.787)
Attacks	0.007 (0.005)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	-0.001 (0.006)	
Rate of Violence		-11.850** (5.074)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence		17.099** (7.119)
Rate of Violence ²		10.726** (5.303)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Rate of Violence ²		-15.800** (7.030)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.212** (0.585)	-1.066 (0.679)
Campaign Size	0.457*** (0.169)	0.507** (0.201)
Repression Levels	-0.219 (0.275)	-0.439 (0.434)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.387 (0.292)	-0.321 (0.437)
Judicial Constraints	-1.243 (1.275)	-0.707 (1.846)
Cold War	-1.178** (0.552)	-1.025 (0.674)
Democracy	0.639 (0.511)	-0.032 (0.685)
Civil War Years	-0.037** (0.016)	0.010 (0.033)
Constant	2.885 (2.613)	4.358 (4.449)
Observations	128	133
Log likelihood	-75.275	-76.251
Chi-squared	19.627	14.429
p	0.051	0.344

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Figure A4.1 Predicted Probabilities of the Nonlinear Effect of Violence




Table A4.2 Violent Tactics

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions	(2) At Least Limited Concessions	(3) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	0.396 (0.664)	-0.106 (0.829)	0.921 (0.808)
Frontal Attacks	0.011 (0.008)		
Mixed Uncoordinated * Frontal Attacks	0.032** (0.014)		
Riots		-0.414** (0.180)	
Mixed Uncoordinated * Riots		0.447** (0.193)	
Underground Attacks			0.014 (0.010)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Underground Attacks			-0.010 (0.010)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.066* (0.587)	-1.065* (0.611)	-1.246** (0.577)
Campaign Size	0.455** (0.186)	0.464*** (0.163)	0.430** (0.171)
Repression Levels	-0.221 (0.299)	-0.406 (0.361)	-0.216 (0.276)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.425 (0.294)	-0.190 (0.390)	-0.327 (0.274)
Judicial Constraints	-1.527 (1.305)	-0.772 (1.426)	-1.136 (1.308)
Cold War	-1.018* (0.525)	-0.774 (0.623)	-1.136** (0.580)
Democracy	0.681 (0.503)	0.336 (0.605)	0.608 (0.529)
Civil War Years	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.035** (0.016)
Constant	3.390 (2.580)	2.217 (3.666)	2.415 (2.567)
Observations	128	150	128
Log likelihood	-71.917	-87.613	-76.670
Chi-squared	20.363	14.964	18.411
p	0.041	0.184	0.073

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Table A4.3 Violence and Fragmentation

	(1) At Least Limited Concessions
Mixed Uncoordinated	1.637 (1.021)
New Organizations	0.296** (0.117)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations	-0.250* (0.141)
Attacks	0.017** (0.007)
Mixed Uncoordinated * Attacks	-0.010 (0.008)
New Organizations * Attacks	-0.007*** (0.002)
Mixed Uncoordinated * New Organizations * Attacks	0.007** (0.003)
Hierarchical Leadership	-1.343** (0.612)
Campaign Size	0.441** (0.176)
Repression Levels	-0.207 (0.271)
Log GDP Per Capita	-0.341 (0.324)
Judicial Constraints	-1.596 (1.250)
Cold War	-1.320** (0.600)
Democracy	0.585 (0.522)
Civil War Years	-0.037** (0.018)
Constant	1.784 (2.667)
Observations	128
Log likelihood	-72.883
Chi-squared	20.841
p	0.142

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001

Appendix 5. Comments about the Construction of the Database

1. GTD specifications

In the GTD (LaFree and Dugan 2007), for an event to be registered all of the three following criteria must be met: (1) the incident must be intentional—the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator; (2) must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence—including property violence, as well as violence against people; and (3) the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.²⁹ The database also includes events that satisfy at least two of the following criteria: (1) the act must be aimed to attain political, economic, religious, or social goals; (2) there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience; (3) the action must be outside the legitimate warfare activities. I excluded events that did not satisfied criterion (1) and (2). The goal was to have a pool of *organized attacks linked to major struggles* against the government.

In the CNTS (Banks and Wilson 2013), the events included were:

- *Violent events:*
 - Assassinations: “Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician”;
 - Terrorism/guerrilla warfare: “Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime”; and
 - Riots: “Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force”. This category did not involve any specification about a political motive but given that I am considering maximalist campaigns it is very likely that almost any conflict-related event will be linked to such campaign.
- *Non-violent events:*
 - Strikes: “Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.”

²⁹ I excluded events of state terrorism.

- Demonstrations: “Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.”

Appendix 6. Coordination Between Radicals and Moderates

In the manuscript, I theorized that mixed campaigns can be either coordinated or uncoordinated depending on whether moderates or radicals were the dominant actor. Here, I provide additional further details to that simple game to explain how such a situation occurs and how does coordinated and uncoordinated campaigns emerge.

The setup of the game is as follows. There are two players, Radicals and Moderates who can choose between Coordinate their actions or Not Coordinate. This setup implies a symmetric coordination game and the payoffs are arranged in the following matrix.

Table A6.1. Coordination Between Radicals and Moderates


		<i>Moderates</i>	
		Coordinate	No Coordination
<i>Radicals</i>	Coordinate	μ, μ	β, α
	No Coordination	α, β	π, π

As I suggested, both actors prefer to be without the other one. However, in mixed campaigns they will have to choose whether to coordinate or not depending on their relative strength given that no actor can prevail over the other. When *moderates are stronger*, they always prefer not coordination because $U^M(\pi > \beta, \alpha > \mu)$, regardless of what radicals do. In contrast, as $U^R(\mu > \alpha)$ if moderates choose coordinate, thus radicals choose coordination; but, as $U^R(\pi > \beta)$ if moderates choose not to coordinate, thus radicals choose no coordination. The rationale goes as follows. If moderates prefer to coordinate with radicals, the latter would be better off coordinating as well given that they tend to mobilize fewer dissidents (Dahl et al. 2014). This situation, however, is not an equilibrium as moderates have always an incentive to deviate to no coordination; otherwise, they have the risk of not being credible in front of rulers and achieve no concessions. Moreover, they will be able to do so as they are usually able to mobilize more dissidents (Kuran 1989; Dahl et al. 2014); in other words, they can avoid including many supporters, as they already have great numbers. In summary, when moderates dominate the campaign, the Nash equilibrium is no coordination as both players are choosing their best responses to what the other does.

When radicals are the strongest actor, $U^R(\beta > \pi, \mu > \alpha)$ regardless of what moderates do. In a similar vein, $U^M(\beta > \pi, \mu > \alpha)$ regardless of what radicals do. In other words, for both actors, no coordination is strictly dominated by coordination. The reason is that, first, radicals are willing to accept moderates in their ranks given that they have few dissidents. Moderates may harm radicals as they can be coopted more easily; however, moderates are much less credible than if they were the dominant actor. Moreover, radicals are credible punishers for such kind of defections. Thus, moderates will be better off coordinating with radicals, otherwise they might face punishment and will lose relevance in the conflict.

An important point is why would moderates be in the streets if there are not enough protesters. However, these situations point out to conditions where there are enough protesters for some moderates to participate, but not enough for moderates to be the dominant actor. To some extent, this implies that the cascade of participation of moderates achieves mid-levels (Kuran 1989). If this is correct, we should observe that mixed coordinated campaigns involve fewer participants than campaigns when moderates dominate. The following figure shows evidence in that direction. I estimated and plotted difference of means in campaign size between uncoordinated and coordinate campaigns from Column 3 in Table 3 of the manuscript. Coordinated campaigns have fewer participants than uncoordinated ones, but these differences are not significant.

Figure A6.1. Participation Rates of Mixed Campaigns.



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Links to Databases

<i>Violent and non-violent actions</i>	Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Cross-National Time-Series
<i>Campaigns</i>	NAVCO
<i>GDP per capita</i>	Maddison database
<i>Political Terror Scale</i>	PTS
<i>Regime type</i>	DD
<i>Judicial constraints</i>	V-DEM

Source: own elaboration.