NÚMERO 53

MICHAEL J. SAUTER

Conscience and the Rhetoric of Freedom: Fichte's Reaction to the Edict on Religion

JUNIO 2008

www.cide.edu

Las colecciones de **Documentos de Trabajo** del **CIDE** representan un medio para difundir los avances de la labor de investigación, y para permitir que los autores reciban comentarios antes de su publicación definitiva. Se agradecerá que los comentarios se hagan llegar directamente al (los) autor(es).

• D.R. ® 2008. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, carretera México-Toluca 3655 (km. 16.5), Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210, México, D.F.
Fax: 5727•9800 ext. 6314
Correo electrónico: publicaciones@cide.edu
www.cide.edu

Producción a cargo del (los) autor(es), por lo que tanto el contenido así como el estilo y la redacción son su responsabilidad.

Abstract

This essay explores Johann Gottlieb Fichte's supposedly critical reaction to Prussia's Edict on Religion of 1788. The word "supposed" is acceptable here, because in the course of his career, Fichte actually took both sides —for and against the edict. Fichte has long been seen as a prophet of the modern individual, but this essay shows how his reaction(s) to the edict reveal a world of social anxieties among the German elite that suffused and limited their understanding of individual freedom. Put most succinctly, this essay holds that Fichte's complicated understanding of intellectual freedom represents the victory of enlightened social exclusion and, thus, casts doubt on the way historians have included him in an emancipatory "enlightened" project.

Resumen

Este ensayo explora la supuesta reacción crítica de Johann Gottlieb Fichte al Edicto sobre la Religión de Prusia en 1788. La palabra "supuesta" es aceptable aquí porque de hecho durante el curso de su carrera, Fichte tomo partido en ambos lados —a favor y en contra del edicto. Ficthe ha sido visto durante mucho tiempo como un profeta del individuo moderno, pero este ensayo muestra que sus reacciones al edicto revelan un mundo lleno de ansiedades sociales entre la élite Alemana, lo cual cubría y limitaba su entendimiento de la libertad individual. Dicho de manera sucinta, este ensayo sostiente que el complejo entendimiento de la libertad intelectual de Fichte representa la victoria de la exclusión social ilustrada y por esto, pone en duda la manera en que los historiadores lo han incluido en un proyecto emancipatorio e "ilustrado".

Introduction

This essay pursues the youthful rebellion against social control through an analysis of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's reaction(s) to the Edict on Religion. Whereas most participants in the public debate took one side or the other, Fichte took both —a *volte face* that underscores not only the ambiguities of elite politics in the German world but also, as we will see, the continued significance of social-intellectual markers to German elites. Only 26 years old when the edict was promulgated, Fichte was part of a different generation that wanted to join the enlightened elite but often found the doors to advancement closed.[1] Caught between his accumulated academic merit and his wounded pride, Fichte reinterpreted traditional "enlightened" practices of social distinction in a way that served the perpetuation of the elite, but in a context that was being shaped by great political and social changes.

Against this backdrop, it will be useful to step back and consider the problem from a broader perspective. The relationship between the German intellectual elite's ambiguous social situation and its collective attitude toward state oversight of personal behavior dominated the eighteenth century. In general, during much of the century, the educated elite (*Gelehrten*) accepted the state's right to oversee the behavior of the lower orders, while also resisting oversight of their own thoughts and actions. Anton Friedrich Büsching, who was both an opponent of the Edict on Religion and one of Johann Heinrich Schulz's chief tormentors, is a primary example of how the older state-supported elite distinguished sharply between itself and the people it was charged with governing.[2] Fichte provides a unique perspective on the problem of social distinction in the German Enlightenment, because he rebelled against traditional authorities and practices, while continuing to distinguish just as sharply between himself and the masses. This essay traces how he did this and considers the results against the backdrop of a post-Napoleonic world.

This essay analyzes the course of the public battle over the Edict on Religion by considering the struggle that occurred within the mind of one person, Fichte. Fichte is justly famous as a chief progenitor of the imposing philosophical tradition called German Idealism and also deserves recognition, along with Wilhelm von Humboldt, as a major force behind the development of German liberalism.[3] In this latter context his famous *Reclamation of the*

[1] Henri Brunschwig was the first to call attention to the significance of this issue. Brunschwig, *Enlightenment and Romanticism*. For an in-depth study of the phenomenon of "poor students" in the German Enlightenment, see La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit.*

[2] The perceived gap between the bureaucracy and the populace grew ever wider during the nineteenth century. See Beck, "The Social Policies of Prussian Officials".

[3] On Fichte's position in German philosophy of the late eighteenth-century, see Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987). On Fichte's place

Return of Freedom of Thought from Europe's Princes, Who Have Suppressed It Until Now, published in 1793, places him squarely within a tradition that justified freedom of thought against state control, or so it would seem.[4]

Less well known than the *Reclamation*, but equally significant for understanding late eighteenth-century approaches to "liberal" autonomy, is an unpublished earlier draft of the same, Fichte's "Open Call to the Residents of the Prussian States Prompted by the 'Frank Meditations and Respectful Ideas Concerning the New Prussian Ordinances in Religious Matters.'"[5] Probably written in 1792, Fichte's "Open Call" was a direct response to a work published in 1791 by the enlightened pedagogue Ernst Christian Trapp under the title *Frank Meditations and Respectful Ideas Concerning the New Prussian Ordinances in Religious Matters.*[6] The Prussian Ordinances in question were those promulgated by Johann Christoph Woellner's Edict on Religion. Hence, our analysis begins from the standpoint that it was the edict that prompted Fichte's earliest attempts to define freedom of thought and a reading of both responses to the edict should provide new perspective on not only the issues that the edict raised for the German elite but also the tension-filled origins of German liberal thought.

Given Fichte's "liberal" reputation, his "Open Call" is notable for its having exhorted Prussians to respect both the Edict on Religion and the good intentions that stood behind it. In stark contrast to this gentleness of spirit is

---

in German Idealism, see the excellent summary in Daniel Breazeale, "Fichte and Schilling: the Jena period", in *The Age of German Idealism*, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (London Routledge, 1993). On liberalism, see Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 13-26, 59, Guido De Ruggiero and R. G. Collingwood, *The History of European Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 212-24. On Humboldt, see Christina M. Sauter, *Wilhelm von Humboldt und die deutsche Aufklaerung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989). On the difficult relationship between republicanism and liberalism, see Hans Erich Bödeker, "The Concept of the Republic in Eighteenth-Century German Thought", in *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750-1850*, ed. Jürgen Heideking, James A. Henretta, and Peter Becker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Bödeker's point that democratic streams of thought inspired by the French Revolution were more responsible for the rise of liberal thought in Germany than traditional republican ideas, which were rooted in an aristocratic notion of governance, is compatible with the argument made in this text. On the same theme, see Otto Dann, "Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750-1850", in *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750-1850*, ed. Jürgen Heideking, James A. Henretta, and Peter Becker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 70-71. More broadly, see Fritz Valjavec, *Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland 1770–1815* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1951).

[4] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Zurückforderung der Denkfreiheit von den Fürsten Europens, die sie bisher unterdrückten* (Heliopolis: [1793]). Reprinted in Reinharth Lauth and Hans Jacob, eds., *J. G. Fichte–Gesamtausgabe Der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, vol. I (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Günther Holzboog], 1964).

[5] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, "Zuruf an die Bewohner der preussischen Staaten veranlasst durch die freimüthigen Betrachtungen und ehrerbietigen Vorstellungen über die neuen preussischen Anordnungen in geistlichen Sachen", in *J. G. Fichte–Gesamtausgabe Der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1967). The editors of the *GA* have put this work under the rubric "Entwürfe zur Zurückforderung der Denkfreiheit" (Drafts of the Demand for the Return of Freedom of Thought) and argue that Fichte probably wrote the text around 1792. See Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob, eds., *J. G. Fichte–Gesamtausgabe Der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1967), 180. Frederick Beiser argues, however, that the text must have been produced earlier, in 1791. Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 378 (note 66).

[6] Trapp, *Freymüthige Betrachtungen.*

the warning that he issued only a year later in the *Reclamation*, when he wrote, "Humanity takes revenge in the most gruesome ways on its oppressors. Revolutions are becoming necessary."[7] This essay offers a close reading of both texts and then considers the nature of the shift in Fichte's attitudes by connecting the author and his texts to the tense intellectual world we mentioned above. That Fichte dramatically reformulated his view of both the Edict on Religion and state control of free thought cannot be denied. One way of explaining this change is to note the powerful stresses produced by his search, as a young *Gelehrter*, for both an independent sense of identity and career advancement within an environment that did not reward intellectual independence.[8] In essence, the fractious and intellectually self-determining Fichte chafed at the constraints placed on him by the system of patronage and tutelage that the German experience with enlightenment had produced, to the point where, in the *Reclamation*, he broke violently with the very notion of official oversight of (his) free thought. This essay will establish, however, that a deep continuity also ran across this supposed break with authority, in the form of an elaborate intellectual elitism that, with Fichte's assistance, came to permeate German thought well into the twentieth century. The attitudes that undergirded the "official" Enlightenment in Germany did not disappear as the eighteenth century came to an end; they were, instead, sublated (*aufgehoben*) and applied to new political and social contexts.

Historians have overlooked Fichte in their analyses of the debate about the Edict on Religion. This neglect may well stem from Fichte's failure to publish the "Open Call" and to mention the edict explicitly in the *Reclamation*. Nonetheless, both texts were a product of the controversy that surrounded the edict and must, therefore, be included in any discussion of the larger public debate. Consistent with the arguments made previously, we must recollect that conscience —not autonomy— was the fundamental issue for everyone involved in the debate about the Edict on Religion.[9] Regardless of whether we moderns would identify any participant as "liberal" or "conservative," those who joined the contemporary public debate began with the Protestant notion that cultivating one's conscience was central to being human. For many educated German Protestants —especially those who contributed to the debate on the edict itself— defining the sphere of conscience and establishing how it related to political authority was tantamount to a discussion of what enlightenment was.

---

[7] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 170.

[8] On this issue, see La Vopa, *Fichte*.

[9] For general studies of conscience, see Kittsteiner, *Die Entstehung des Modernen Gewissens*, ———, *Gewissen und Geschichte: Studien zur Entstehung des moralischen Bewusstseins*. For a perspective on conscience closely tied to daily life, see Sabean, *Power in the Blood*.

The fascination with conscience that characterized much of the public discussion was a product of German politics' deep connection to Protestantism, at least in those territories that were Protestant.[10] Beyond outlining a sacred space within which conscience was to be cultivated, the Protestant Reformation also provided a sacred history in reference to which contemporary political issues could be evaluated.[11] In sum, Protestants legitimized, or de-legitimized, existing political relationships against the backdrop of the historical-religious events of the Reformation.[12] Eighteenth-century writers were concerned, for example, with what Luther, the Peace of Augsburg, the Peace of Westphalia, or the contemporary battle against the Jesuits meant for *them* and investigated in detail the political and intellectual ramifications. All educated Protestants inherited a vast repository of ideas about political power whose meanings originated in and were shaped by the memory of Luther's rebellion and its aftermath. Those Germans who wrote for or against the edict could not help but make their cases with a political vocabulary that was derived largely from *this* past.[13]

Within this broader historical context, the German Enlightenment's corporate structure shaped all debates about conscience. On the one hand, many Protestant elites entered the intellectual and political world through a system of meritocratic neo-corporatism in which established personages sponsored bright boys as they passed through their educations and into their early professional careers.[14] This was also the case for Fichte, who joined the elite thanks to patronage that allowed him to study theology at Jena. As has been discussed previously, the corporatism that developed in eighteenth-century Germany was intimately related to the expansion of state power after 1750 and was, as a result, different from corporate structures that had traditionally dominated the German states. The new system, for its part,

[10] On the manner in which the Protestant elite recruited and reproduced itself, see La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit*. See also, John Stroup, *The struggle for identity in the clerical estate : Northwest German Protestant opposition to Absolutist policy in the eighteenth century*, Studies in the history of Christian thought; v. 33. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984). For critical comments on Stroup, see William Boehart, "Politik und Religion: Prolegomena zu der Kontroverse zwischen Johan Melchior Goeze und Julius Gustav Alberti über das Busstagsgebet in Hamburg (1769)", in *Das Volks als Objekt obrigkeitlichen Handelns*, ed. Rudolf Vierhaus (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1992). More generally, see Gerth, *Bürgerliche Intelligenz*.

[11] On the memory of Luther, see R. W. Scribner, "Incombustible Luther: The Image of the Reformer in Early Modern Europe", *Past & Present* 110 (1986). For an older interpretation, partially superseded by Scribner's work, see Zeeden, *The Legacy of Luther*. More generally, see Edward G. Andrew, *Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and Modern Subjectivity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). Andrew's text directed mostly at England and, for that reason, misses much of the German approach to conscience.

[12] A good example of this view, and taken directly from the debate about the edict, is Rönnberg, *Ueber Symbolische Bücher*.

[13] For a fascinating look at how religious debates forged political language in France, see Dale K. Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). In contrast to Van Kley's interpretation religious debate in Germany did not de-sacralize the state.

[14] La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit*, ———, "The Revelatory Moment"; Brunschwig, *Enlightenment and Romanticism*. This is only applicable to Protestant northern states. Württemberg, a southern Protestant state, had a closed recruitment system. See James Allen Vann, *The Making of a State*.

recruited from a broader pool of candidates and, in turn, produced degree holders that took great pride in having earned their new status. In general, the system of sponsored merit formed people who were intensely aware of where everyone belonged and what was properly due to each. Although the German elite waxed poetic in print about the virtues of freedom and autonomy, the belief that autonomy needed limits (and that any expansion of these limits had to be earned) was fundamental to the world that had produced them.

Meritocratic neo-corporatism, the weighty history of Protestantism, and the fascination with conscience played important roles within the works of Fichte that we will consider below. Taken together, they encapsulate the tensions that became visible when members of the German Enlightenment found it necessary to redefine their autonomy at the eighteenth century's end.[15] The Edict on Religion was an attempt to update traditional structures of enlightened social control for a new situation, even if "enlightened" critics vociferously proclaimed their opposition to it. Taking the resulting division over public policy as our backdrop, the analysis of Fichte's reaction to the edict will show that even the most radical critiques still incorporated the basic assumptions that the early-modern Protestant world had produced.[16] If the battle lines were sharply drawn during the fight over the Edict on Religion, it was not because the spirit of the Enlightenment was under siege, but because increasing numbers of *Gelehrten* resented "enlightened" controls on their behavior. As we will see, however, the distinction between the educated elite and the common folk was not called into question, and the implications of this for German culture would echo across the next two centuries.

Fichte's First Response to the Edict on Religion

The "Open Call" was never published and served as an early sounding board for Fichte's thoughts on the Edict on Religion. Merely ten pages long, as opposed to the *Reclamation*'s twenty-five, it contained nothing more than an introduction and a few preliminary arguments. Its significance for us lies, however, in its defense of both the edict and Frederick William II against their "enlightened" critics. Fichte began with an implicit critique of the critics:

> Not for you are these pages written, enlightened [*erleuchteten*] friends of your good King and his administration, who accept his decrees with trust in

[15] In general, see the essays in Scott, ed., *Enlightened Absolutism*.

[16] For discussions of how the fear of religious unrest shaped political and intellectual debates, see La Vopa, "The Philosopher and the Schwärmer".

> his wisdom and benevolence and examine them with a good heart and without prejudice, for you do not need them;[17]

These words are surprising if one accepts that the Edict on Religion and the Enlightenment were on different sides of an unbridgeable divide, with Fichte situated unequivocally on the latter. However, the distance between support for and opposition to the edict was not that great. Indeed, Fichte's text shows us that as late as the early 1790s it was possible for a *Gelehrter* to take either side in the battle. In this context, the text opens a new vista on the effect that the edict had on members of the German elite.

The "Open Call" underscores, foremost, how deeply neo-corporatism had penetrated the German mind. This essay understands Fichte's text as an expression of support for the traditional rules according to which *Gelehrten* were to talk about religion. Consider the full title of Fichte's work, "Open Call to the Residents of the Prussian States Prompted by the 'Frank Meditations and Respectful Ideas Concerning the New Prussian Ordinances in Religious Matters.'" The title notwithstanding, Fichte's call did not include all the residents of the Prussian states, but was directed only to those who were both literate (a growing, but still relatively small population) and read (or were aware of) Christian Trapp's anonymously published work (which likely comprised an even smaller population).[18] In addition, by clearly identifying the text to be evaluated, Ernst Christian Trapp's anonymously published *Frank Meditations*, Fichte demonstrated his allegiance to the basic rules of the game: one anonymous *Gelehrter* engaged in a highly ritualized *print* battle with another anonymous Gelehrter over a policy question.[19] The very title of Fichte's work amounts, therefore, to a claim to membership in a club whose rules of conduct were deeply socially inscribed.

If the values and rituals that are embedded in the title itself were insufficient to establish this case, the text provides conclusive evidence in support. Consider how Fichte identified himself:

> I am a *Gelehrter* and theologian, *and by what right I claim both titles will decide he who is both himself, and who has read this text to it conclusion.* As both the former and the latter, I feel more strongly than many other people that all our knowledge should lead to the highest purpose, and I will do everything in my power to prevent any deviations from that path.[20]

---

[17] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 187.

[18] On the spread of literacy in general, see R. A. Houston, *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500-1800* (London: Longman, 1988). For its role in early-modern Germany, see Lyndal Roper and R. W. Scribner, *Religion and Culture in Germany (1400–1800)* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 235-58. On print in early-modern Europe, see the still useful article Elizabeth Eisenstein, "Some Conjectures about the Impact of Printing on Western Society and Thought: A Preliminary Report", *Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 1 (1968).

[19] Trapp, *Freymüthige Betrachtungen.*

[20] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, 197.

There is no lack of projection in these words, and much of it stems from the desire of a young college drop out (Fichte never completed his degree) to gain recognition from people he would have be his peers. We will consider the social yearnings pregnant within these writings later in this essay. For now, however, we must emphasize how Fichte also deliberately encoded, within the text, his membership in the elite.

Note, first, that Fichte expressly separates the *Gelehrter* from the theologian. German *Gelehrten* moved within a much bigger intellectual world than did their predecessors of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries, in so far as educated people of all types had become empowered to consider religious questions that had once been the exclusive province of the theologians.[21] Second, note also that the entire phrase is self-referential with respect to this larger group, in that Fichte's status is determined by the mutual acceptance of his peers and no one else. The corporate intellectualism that permeates the quote above highlights the perpetuation of the elitist consensus that we have mentioned above. The "Open Call" was not all that open, but served, in fact, as an opportunity for Fichte to justify his membership in the club.

Fichte's rhetoric is emblematic of the "enlightened" world of the service elite that we have discussed. As we have noted, this elite inscribed public debate with its own social and political interests, which meant that elite politics was always embedded in any written text, even in an ostensibly non-political one, such as a legal decision. It is thus, significant that Fichte included his own political critique of Frederick II, the recently deceased King of Prussia, within a text that was supportive of the latter's successor. Echoing the language of the Edict on Religion, Fichte charged that the excesses of Frederick II's reign had harmed religion in Prussia and, in contrast, characterized Frederick William II as a father figure who was setting his predecessor's policies aright. At this point, Fichte's understanding of politics was no different from the Edict on Religion, and he demonstrated the extent to which a traditional paternalistic ethos dominated his thought, when he told his readers that the discomfort that the edict had caused some Prussian subjects (read: the Gelehrten) did not outweigh its benefits to the general population.

Given Fichte's search for recognition by his colleagues, it should be no surprise that he originally intended to use the public sphere to support the

[21] On this issue, see Hans Erich Bödeker, "Die Religiösität der Gebildeten," *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung* 11 (1989), Notker Hammerstein, "Die deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 10, no. 1 (1983), Sparn, "Auf dem Wege." Extremely important in this respect is Ian Hunter's idea of a "Civic Enlightenment" in Germany. Ian Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early-Modern Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The nature of the competition between the new elite of Gelehrten and the old one of theologians is also evident in the Lessing-Goeze debate as well as Immanuel Kant's famous *The Contest of Faculties* (1798). On the significance of Lessing's religious views to German debate in general, see Epstein, *Genesis* , Zeeden, *The Legacy of Luther*, 139, Redekop, *Enlightenment and Community: Lessing, Abbt, Herder and the Quest for a German Public*. Kant's text is available in Reiss, ed., *Kant's Political Writings*, 176-90.

government. And consistent with the German elite's desire to maintain an ordered public sphere, he pled with those people who had yet to take a position to do so with the proper attitude. For that reason, he expressly praised Frederick William II for having demonstrated concern for his people's spiritual well-being and lamented that so many authors had responded to the government's initiative by attempting to turn peoples' hearts against their leader.[22] This textual moment turns our attention to conscience, as it reveals one possible result of a conscience-based politics. (The *Reclamation* will show us another). In this case, the "protection" of conscience was understood through a monarchical and paternalistic context that had long assumed the Prussian kings were responsible for many things, including the care of people's souls. (That Immanuel Kant opposed this sort of thinking makes this intellectual trend no less real). Moreover, this association of monarchy with conscience opens a new door onto the process of the Enlightenment in Germany, in so far as the *Aufklärer* embraced the use of traditional state powers to tutor the masses, especially through the diffusion of preachers through the rural landscape. Conscience became a realm in which the relationship between the monarch and his subjects could be managed.

Fichte's "Open Call" reminds us how thoroughly monarchist much of the German Enlightenment was.[23] Wilhelm von Humboldt, for instance, was both a convinced liberal and a committed monarchist.[24] Moreover, it also reveals how this monarchism itself mandated certain practices with the eighteenth-century public sphere. In the text, Fichte, like many other writers, associated conscience with the expression of personal disinterest, a rhetorical tool that aided the writer in his attempts to avoid conflicts with the power center. Fichte wrote:

> Trust me. No personal interests guide my quill. Prussia's king is as unknown to me as any other monarch on the earth. I honor him for nothing more than that he is a great and good man. I am a foreigner who is currently a guest in Prussia, but only for a short time, and will leave again soon, as I came.[25]

We see here the same concern for maintaining the public as a moral realm that appeared in Immanuel Kant's "What is Enlightenment?" In asking for the

[22] Ibid., 195-96.

[23] For a general overview, see John Christian Laursen, Hans Blom, and Luisa Simonutti, eds., *Monarchists and Monarchism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). On Prussia and Germany, see Melton, "From Enlightenment to Revolution", Diethelm Klippel, "Reasonable Aims of Civil Society: Concerns of the State in German Political Theory in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries", in *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany*, ed. John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Günter Birtsch, "Reform Absolutism and the Codification of Law: The Genesis and Nature of the Prussian General Code (1794)", in *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany*, ed. John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[24] Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 111.

[25] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 189.

reader's trust and making himself worthy of it through the cultivation of moderate rhetorical independence, Fichte unified the conscience-laden language that all intellectuals shared with the common practice of protecting both the participants' and the king's honor.

Fichte asked for trust not because he was using his reason publicly, in the classic "enlightened" sense, but because he could be *trusted* to use his reason publicly and within the existing political arrangements. He was, after all, a *Gelehrter* who had no personal stake in the discussion, which meant that he would make no political trouble, nor would he attack anyone directly. Fichte's profession of disinterest is even more revealing when we look at the sentence immediately prior:

> Trust me. I do not seek to storm your heart with declamations, to deceive your judgment with powers of persuasion, or to excite your passions through emotion. I want to weigh reasons against reasons with a firm hand. I trust that you want to be just and upright. Honor my trust.[26]

Fichte's cultivation of abstract disinterest was, therefore, inseparable from the enlightened mixture of conscience and publicity that we have already discussed. Like many educated Germans, the young Fichte was no Demosthenes; he tried to persuade people of his position's virtues without getting them so excited that they would march on Berlin.

The need to combine conscience and personal disinterest within a monarchical environment also mandated another common "enlightened" practice, anonymous publication. In the sentence that appears immediately after the one first quoted on page 9 above, (where Fichte identifies himself as *Gelehrter*) Fichte goes on to justify his anonymity, writing:

> No one will learn of my name. Moreover, this quill would fall from my hand, were I aware that thoughts of any possible private judgment had influenced me while reaching for it.[27]

Fichte's view of anonymity is fundamentally linked to the monarchist backdrop of German public letters. Anonymity strengthened the position of rhetorical disinterest, because it radically separated public from private in a way similar to Immanuel Kant's detachment of the two in "What is Enlightenment?" In this context, and in contrast to what we moderns may experience on our internet, anonymity civilized debate by limiting its personal, political, and social implications. On the one hand, an individual prince could not be offended by a work that evaluated only the efficacy of a given royal policy, since anonymous debates were structured solely to critique

[26] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 188.
[27] Ibid., 189.

policy in abstract and general terms. On the other hand, no Gelehrter's honor could be wounded in the exchange, since both sides concentrated on the arguments presented —and not on the person presenting them. Seen from this eighteenth-century perspective, it seems that full publicity, in the sense of everyone's name being known to all participants, actually may have prevented the frank and open exchange of views on matters of general concern.[28]

Fichte, thus, presented his intended readers with the ground rules that structured so much of the German debate. He was a *Gelehrter*, independent of the issue at hand, and interested only in speaking truth without, of course, rousing anyone's emotions. Public discussion, as he and many others saw it, ought to be —indeed, could only be— held calmly among social and intellectual equals. As Fichte put it at the end of the introduction:

> Harsh attacks on those who think differently serve only him who cannot rely on the strength of his reasons. The language of persuasion is gentle. Each person who speaks a different language reveals through it only the lack of conviction that he wishes to hide with it.[29]

Fichte's rhetorical strategy was situated within a world that balanced multiple values against each other. Two of these values, the need for political stability and the conventions of conscience have been present throughout this book. Yet, Fichte also highlights the continued significance of personal honor to the maintenance of public discussion. For Fichte, the desire to protect his place in the world as a social and political creature required him to argue without giving offense to anyone, since the rules of public debate also imposed a reciprocal duty on others not to insult *him*. Hence, by the end of the eighteenth century, cultivating the rules of debate had become central to the German public sphere.

After Fichte set the ground rules, he then entered into a discussion of Frederick II's reign (1740-1786) and also considered what the recent transition to a new monarch meant. Fichte praised Frederick for his successes as king, but he also added a back-handed compliment, saying that he had actually been too big for the position. As Fichte put it, "everyone who came close to him felt the enormous power [*Übermacht*] not of the monarch, but of the man."[30] Frederick was, in many ways, superhuman and for that reason was personally beyond religion. This did not mean, however, that everyone was beyond it, and especially not the masses. According to Fichte, Frederick William II understood the need for religion in daily life, since the latter had

---

[28] There was disagreement among intellectuals about anonymity's benefits to public debate. Johann Gottfried Herder was, for example, opposed to anonymous publication. See La Vopa, "The Revelatory Moment", 152-53.
[29] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 189.
[30] Ibid., 193.

taken action to protect his people's religious beliefs, and he added that such protection was essential for the people's peace and happiness.

In Fichte's view, Frederick William's policies were a justified response to Frederick's personal excesses. He noted that opposition to this paternal intervention came from people who failed to consider the edict's true intent:

> The system of Prussian government must take certain measures that however beneficial to the whole will, for a time, burden the individual. People promised themselves that a new regime would bring relief. (And what do people not promise themselves from new regimes?) Relief came, but some received, nonetheless, less relief than their neighbors —often much less than [had been] hoped for.[31]

The most important aspect of Fichte's argument is his explicit recognition that free thought had damaged the less educated. He made this point a few sentences later:

> Scholarship bloomed and a flame of investigation arose in scholars' heads, a beneficial ferment that helped spread light across all of Europe. As with any good thing that is easily misused, freedom developed into license, and preliminary results that should have served only as precursors and signposts to further research were taken to be final results. Principles that could have been without detriment the property of an intelligent, educated mind were transferred to popular instruction [*Volksunterricht*]. The people became confused and strayed from their former path—*the only one, I postulate with clear evidence, that suits them properly*—and were misled into dry and barren deserts.[32]

Fichte's concern for the people's limitations was less pronounced by the time he wrote the final draft of his *Reclamation* in 1793. As the highlighted section above points out, however, in 1792 he was still working within an academic paradigm that not only separated elite from mass but also intertwined the needs of the state with those of the educated elite.

After completing the preliminaries, Fichte turned to the main point of his work, refuting Ernst Christian Trapp's *Frank Meditations*. Since Fichte never engaged Trapp's text fully, writing only some introductory comments, we will forgo comparing the *Reclamation* directly with the *Frank Meditations*. For the purposes of this essay, it is most important to note that Fichte used his text as a means to put himself within a specific intellectual community and for that reason did not violate the pact of anonymity. Although he may have suspected

---

[31] Ibid., 195.
[32] Ibid. Emphasis added.

his protagonist's name, he showed the good taste never to mention it, avoiding thus a direct and personal confrontation.[33] He wrote:

> The author of the text *Frank Meditations* flatters himself to have put the case as it has not been put before. I know that it has made quite a stir here and there and that it has confused the well meaning here and there. To refute this work is, thus, to refute the strongest contemporary voice among the opponents of this measure.[34]

Fichte's response to Trapp reveals the many practices that united opponents and proponents of the edict, even as the policy itself divided them. Consider that Fichte made his case by appealing to the same rules that his opponent had publicly extolled. Whereas Trapp justified his disinterest by claiming to be a foreigner, Fichte did so as well. Moreover, since the flight into disinterest was fundamental to the way the educated community discussed politically charged topics, it is important that Fichte reached a conclusion opposed to Trapp's, even though he began with the same distinctions:

> I am a foreigner as is he, whatever else he may be. As a human being, I feel the call to consider what appears to be an important affair for all of humanity, as does he in his opinion.[35]

This quote encapsulates the worldview that we have been reconstructing, as it shows us a vision of a responsible *Gelehrter* as an intellectual who presents his ideas without causing political trouble or social unrest. These *Gelehrten* willingly accepted the limits on their ability to talk to the people, because it was in their political and social interest to do so. The elite's bonds to state authority did not, however, guarantee that the *Gelehrten* were a static presence in society. If the club's members were to reject the limits placed on them by the state, a different take on social control could emerge, which is what happened in Fichte's *Reclamation*.

Early in his life Fichte spoke as a *Gelehrter* who negotiated his way through a rapidly changing world. In this he mirrored his older contemporary, Woellner, whose view of Prussian life was suffused with the language of reason and reform that characterized much of the German Enlightenment. The belief that untrammeled religious speculation was dangerous for the uninitiated permeated Fichte's early work and the work of many others, as we have seen. Yet, the tension that became manifest in the debate about the edict arose from the recognition of another danger, namely that Woellner had gained, with the publication of the Censorship Edict on 9 December 1788, the

---

[33] Much of the speculation occurred in private correspondence. See, for example, Fichte's letter to Theodor von Schön of 21 April 1792. Lauth, eds., *GA*, II, 302-04.

[34] Lauth, eds., *GA*, I, 196.

[35] Ibid., 197.

power to control the thought of educated people, too. It was the direct intrusion of state power into the public sphere that had been created and policed by the *Gelehrten* that altered the dynamic of Fichte's thought.

Fichte's Radical Demands

Fichte's *Reclamation of Freedom of Thought from Europe's Princes, Who Have Suppressed It Until Now* was, unlike his "Open Call", breathtakingly radical in tone. Rather than calling for calm discussion of an important public issue, Fichte attacked Germany's princes for practicing censorship and demanded complete freedom of thought, even going so far as to call the French Revolution a grim warning that oppression had consequences. Thus, unlike most of the texts produced in response to the edict, Fichte's *Reclamation* was *intended* to provoke a heated response rather than to invite calm reflection. This change is, perhaps, the most fundamental aspect of Fichte's radicalization, as he broke with the practices of public debate that had long been characteristic of the German Enlightenment. His rebellion can, therefore, be best understood with reference to the elite world that had produced him.

Fichte's deep connections to the elitist enterprise that was the German Enlightenment helps to explain why, in spite of its radical tone, the text betrays little radical politics: Fichte's tirade was limited to attacks on censorship alone.[36] For that reason, this text must be read as an extension of the traditional enlightened mission of defining who had the right not to be censored. Against this backdrop, this section will argue that the absence of radical politics in the *Reclamation* highlights the continued significance of the three themes we have considered above, conscience, Protestantism, and meritocratic neo-corporatism. The call for free expression in Fichte's work was not a call for autonomy of the celebrated Kantian variety; it was, rather, a reformulation of Protestant conscience's traditional rights for a new political situation.[37]

Let us begin by pursuing the harshness, even impudence, of Fichte's tone in the *Reclamation*, because it is here that a fundamental break with the "Open Call" occurred. Note whom Fichte addresses with his text:

> Prince, you have no right to suppress our freedom of thought. What you have no right to do you must never do, even should the world collapse around you, and bury you with your people under the rubble. He who gave us the rights

[36] For a discussion of eighteenth-century German political vocabularies, see Melton, "From Enlightenment to Revolution."
[37] As will be obvious throughout, this essay's reading of Fichte has been influenced by Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1957).

> that you should respect will care for you, the rubble, and those of us under it.[38]

In the German context, this was a political statement. Rather than petitioning the prince respectfully and indirectly for a change in policy, or even submitting an alternate policy option to the public in the context of an academic debate, Fichte simply tells him what to do. With these traditional practices in mind, we see that Fichte committed two sins. He spoke directly to Germany's princes without due deference and exhorted the people to make similar demands of their leaders. The "official" Enlightenment must have been horrified.

However, as with any complicated thinker, there are important countervailing nuances within the text that require explication. Regardless of his pugnacious tone, it is important to recall that Fichte was not really making threats on behalf of the people, but of the *Gelehrten*. One aspect of his allegiance to the elite is apparent in his use of contract theory. Although contract theory has long been seen as a subversive political doctrine, in the *Reclamation* Fichte transferred the limitations inherent in a politics of conscience to his understanding of the social contract, thus diluting its revolutionary potential. Fichte began the *Reclamation* with the common distinction between alienable and inalienable rights, arguing that citizens could give up some rights on entering society, the alienable ones, but had to keep the other rights, the inalienable ones.[39] By alienable rights he meant the rights we have to control our external behavior. Internal behavior, however, which amounted to personal belief, could never be controlled:

> Such rights that are alienable in the [social] contract can be rights only over our external behavior, not over our inner convictions, since in the latter case no party can be sure whether the another party fulfills the conditions or not. Inner convictions, such as ingenuousness, respect, friendship, gratitude, and love are given freely, and can never be acquired by right.[40]

What did this really mean? It is true that Fichte demarcated with these words the boundaries of a prince's power with respect to conscience, and although this was in itself a political act, it had also been done before. For all his bluster, Fichte went no further in his calls for freedom than to launch

[38] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 187.

[39] It has been argued that Fichte's understanding of contract theory was based in the belief that a social contract made the relation of human beings as *social* creatures possible. Tom Rockmore, *Fichte, Marx and the German Philosophical Tradition* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 26. This is absolutely true, but limited, in so far as the understanding of the social on which this argument is based does not account for the values that Fichte and his cohorts inscribed onto their social world. On Fichte's approach to society more generally, see James Schmidt, "Civil Society and Social Things: Setting the Boundaries of the Social Sciences", *Social Research* 62 (1995), Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 58-59.

[40] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 174.

traditional Protestant broadsides against the papacy: according to this view, the rights of conscience, which had been secured by the Reformation, had been usurped and must be recovered. Fichte's harsh words did not, therefore, augur revolution, but were intended to make the world safe for conscience, once again.[41]

Seen from this perspective, it is important that Fichte's understanding of free thought began with a discussion of whether princes could *prescribe* religious beliefs. Denying princes any right to dictate what the people were to believe in religious matters, Fichte argued that people had the right to reconsider whether their beliefs were true. As he put it, "investigation" (*Nachforschung*) is a human right.[42] Further:

> Therefore, you princes have no rights over our freedom of thought, no power to decide what is true or false, no right to prescribe the objects of our research, or its boundaries, no right to prevent us publishing the results of the same how or to whomever we wish, be they true or false. Your obligations extend only to earthly (irrdische) purposes, not to the elevated (überirrdische) [purposes] of the Enlightenment.[43]

For Fichte, religious freedom was the cornerstone of his conception of human rights, but the form this freedom took reveals the persistence of older ways of thinking. Fichte grounded his understanding of freedom in an expressly Protestant history: in effect, princes had no right to engage in activities that Martin Luther had already denied the Pope. Consider how the very idea of free investigation was drenched in religious meaning:

> If one cannot bear witness before one's own conscience that one is sure of one's own ground, that one is secure enough to bear with dignity all the consequences that the distribution of the recognized and useful truths could have for one, when one speaks the truth—then one either relies on the good nature of these severely accused princes, or on one's own meaningless and inconsequential obscurity.[44]

Although Fichte differed with the edict's author, Woellner, over the state's role in religious practice, he was a product of the same religious world. In this context, consider Fichte's word choice on the broader matter of "investigation". Fichte did not use *Forschung*, which translates directly into English as "research" and also connotes a certain independence from authority, but *Nachforschung*, which can also translate as "inquiry" and does not connote open-ended academic investigation, especially that done in a

[41] On this issue, see La Vopa, "The Revelatory Moment," 159.
[42] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 183.
[43] Ibid., I, 187-88.
[44] Ibid., I, 167.

university environment. Hence, whatever innovations Fichte made in the *Reclamation*, his opposition to Woellner and company emerged from a traditional and staid Protestant context.

We can explain the vehemence of Fichte's arguments more deeply by considering his social insecurity within the world of the *Gelehrten*. Note that, for Fichte, it is the bearing of witness before one's own conscience that grounds one's identity. Without conscience a person either exists only for the prince or languishes, as he put it, in meaningless obscurity —that is without recognition from other *Gelehrten*. Fichte's identity was, therefore, grounded in his ability to bear witness before his own conscience and then to have that act recognized by his equals. The projection of a new, aggressive understanding of conscience onto the German public represents an important change. In essence, Fichte had made his sense of self logically prior to the print world. Whereas the earlier German public sphere had been a realm of credentialed elites that kept their personal feelings out of the public, Fichte's public became a realm in which self-authorized individuals demanded recognition by others who were capable of delivering reassurance. With this alteration the public sphere ceased being an extension of the university lecture hall, or the scholar's office and became a fractious zone, in which prickly types like Fichte made their needs and desires known. Hence, when Fichte rebelled in the *Reclamation*, he did so against traditional ways of understanding the educated individual's relationship to the print world.

For a variety of reasons that we will discuss in the next section Fichte was an angry young man in a Protestant world. Let us consider the Protestant component of his anger. It is no accident that when Fichte highlighted the horrors of despotism in the *Reclamation*, he always used Catholic princes as examples of the worst possible behavior, even explicitly connecting religious oppression with the Inquisition. Consider this description of despotism:

> [Princes] place the rope around humanity's throat and say: Be quiet, be quiet, it is all happening for your own good---so said the Inquisition's executioner to Don Carlos, while engaged in the same activity.[45]

Like many commentators, both for and against the edict, Fichte charged the Catholic Church with intolerance. He did not, however, stop with the church itself and extended his criticism of tyranny to Catholic monarchs as well. As an example not to be emulated, Fichte relayed the tale of Louis XV's teacher telling the young king:

[45] Ibid., I, 172. The editors of the *GA* note that this story is apocryphal.

> All these people, Sire, which you see standing before you, are here for you and are your property. Words that Louis XV's teacher spoke to the royal youth at a great public gathering.[46]

In short, there was neither spiritual nor political freedom in Catholic realms, as respect for the individual was only possible with a corresponding respect for conscience. As Fichte noted:

> If the first principle of thinking autonomously (*Selbstthätigkeit*) weakens within him, directly or indirectly, whether through his confessor or by the order of your religious edicts, then he is entirely a machine, which is what you want, and now you can use him as you like.[47]

Thus, as Fichte saw it, to deny the rights of conscience was the first step in the path to political tyranny, and if we reflect on this position with the Edict on Religion in mind, it becomes clear that the real problem with the Edict on Religion was, ultimately, that it treated Protestants as if they were Catholics.

Although the Protestant, conscience-laden background of Fichte's thought in these texts is clear, the neo-corporatism is subtle, evident more in what Fichte omitted, than what he included. The *Reclamation* was a polemic against princes, and so one would expect the service elite to be absent from the discussion, since they were not only Fichte's social equals but also, often, nominal opponents of excessive intellectual controls. Nonetheless, with the service elite having gained such importance during the course of the century, their needs could not have been far from Fichte's mind when he wrote the *Reclamation*, especially since he wished to make a career among them. The corporatism that went along with the service elite is most evident in Fichte's choice of concepts. Let us return to *Nachforschung* (investigation), which in a Protestant context meant that process by which a believer tested his or her beliefs through re-reading the Bible and other religious texts, as well as by listening to sermons. Practically speaking, however, only the educated elite engaged in *Forschung*, which meant doing independent research and presenting the results to an academic community. Hence, Fichte's emphasis on *Nachforschung* served two purposes. It guaranteed all Protestants a certain (limited) freedom that was based in conscience, while also reserving the realm of *Forschung* to people who had graduated beyond those limits.

The concept of *Nachforschung* offers a key to understanding the *Reclamation*, because it reveals how the rights of conscience can help us to understand Fichte's anthropology, which was an important element of his politics. According to Fichte, conscience made human beings unique, because

[46] Ibid., I, 171.
[47] Ibid., I, 181.

it separated them from animals and, this, justified their spiritual independence. He wrote:

> He carries within his breast a divine spark that elevates him above animals and makes him a citizen [*Mitbürger*] of a world whose first member is God: his conscience. This commands him absolutely and necessarily to want one thing and not the other, doing so freely and from his own energies without any external pressure. In order to obey this inner voice and it requires this absolutely—he must not be pressured externally and must be freed from all foreign influences.[48]

This position is nothing new in the history of western thought. Moreover, anthropology has been fundamental to the western understanding of politics since Aristotle. For our purposes, Fichte's anthropology reveals key restrictions that affected his understanding of politics. Note, that he writes only of wants and not of actions. He could not have done otherwise, of course, since he had already accepted the idea that external acts are quite properly regulated by the state. Nonetheless, the significance of Fichte's distinction between wants and actions is two fold. First, although it frees the individual to explore the boundaries of conscience, it also limits the freedom to apply the lessons learned in daily life, a tactic that enjoyed a long "enlightened" pedigree. Second, it assumes a reciprocal responsibility on the part of the state to protect everyone's right to be free of constraints in these more elevated matters. Thus, regardless of Fichte's break with the paternalistic rhetoric that he had used in the "Open Call," in his new work the state remains implicated in people's daily lives to the extent that it guarantees the right to *believe* differently.

Now, we are in a position to consider more deeply how Fichte's limitations on freedom worked with his elite "enlightened" background. After discussing conscience, Fichte introduced an unorthodox approach to free expression, when he hypothesized that the need to *express* one's own inner thoughts may not be sufficient to justify free expression. It was possible, he believed, that people had agreed to give the state control over public expression, especially since the state controlled other external forms of behavior. Fichte added, however, that even if this were true free expression was actually founded on the right to receive information freely, not to give it freely. As Fichte put it:

> The right to receive freely everything that is of use to us is a component of our personality. It is part of our destiny to use freely anything publicly available to our spiritual and moral development. Freedom and morality would be useless to us without this condition.[49]

[48] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 173.
[49] Ibid., I, 177.

We can detect here the echoes of an older approach to publicity. Whereas Woellner argued that his congregants enjoyed the right to sit in undisturbed calm and to judge for themselves whether his sermons were rational and useful, Fichte took essentially the same position, only for different purposes. On the one hand, Fichte wanted a greater guarantee of freedom than the one Woellner was willing to extend the peasants in Gross-Rietz. On the other hand, Fichte founded this freedom not in the right for all to speak publicly, but to *listen* publicly.

Fichte's understanding of freedom emerged from Germany's extensive experience with preaching, as he assumed the same relationship between producer and consumer of publicly expressed ideas that had always anchored traditional forms of sermonizing. Every Protestant had the right to listen to the local preacher with the intention of exploring his own moral attitudes and, thereby, to become a better citizen. Actions were, of course, another story, and since the social structures of late eighteenth-century Germany limited the number of people who could produce print materials for public consumption, Fichte's text assumed, in effect, that everyone had the right to listen to people like Fichte. None of this discussion should be construed as saying that Fichte was no different from Woellner or the many other supporters of the edict. By comparison to, say, Johann Salomo Semler, the young Fichte was, indeed, a liberal who took issue with those aspects of Woellner's program that limited freedom.[50] Yet, we cannot forget, in this context, how much history bound all of the participants together. In this vein, we will try to understand the continuity that extended across and bound together the changes to which Fichte had responded.

Sources of Angst

Now, let us turn to a brief biographical sketch of Fichte's early life, with the intention of understanding how his background shaped his approach to the late eighteenth century political world. Born in 1762, in Rammenau, a small village in Saxony, Fichte was a weaver's son, which meant that although not poor, he was definitely not born to the German elite.[51] In 1770, Fichte took first step on the path to higher social status, when a certain Baron Ernst Haubolt von Miltitz agreed to support the young boy's studies for what was presumed to be a career in theology. After passing through a variety of local philanthropic and educational institutions, he landed at the University of Leipzig in 1780 to pursue his never-completed degree in theology.

It was during his time at the University of Leipzig, however, that Fichte's fortunes declined, as the baron's widow, upon hearing disturbing reports

[50] The older Fichte was noticeably more conservative. Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 59-60.
[51] The biographical information is taken from La Vopa, *Fichte*, K. Fischer, "Fichte, Johann Gottlieb", in *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, ed. Rochus Wilhelm Liliencron, *et al.* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1875).

about his behavior at school, cut off all financial support. As a result, Fichte was forced to leave Leipzig lacking not only a degree but also the political support that was a prerequisite for pursuing a clerical career in his home state. Needing to support himself, Fichte pursued the only avenue open to an educated, unemployed fellow without prospects; he entered the private tutoring circuit that soured so many of his contemporaries on the German system of education and social control.[52] In short, whereas Fichte earned enough to eat and even found joy in some of the people he met along the way, he still spent his early twenties stewing in his own dissatisfaction.

This brief sketch of Fichte's early life highlights a fundamental problem that many of the younger generation of German scholars shared, the need to implicate themselves in a system of patronage, in order to land a position that would provide (some) intellectual and financial independence. Fichte did not escape the clutches of the dead-end tutoring industry until the end of 1793, by which time the celebrity that he had acquired through his writings led to his nomination as professor of philosophy at the University of Jena. We will not pursue this aspect of Fichte's biography any further, except to note that the stresses and strains of his unenviable position contributed, according to Anthony J. LaVopa, to Fichte's eventual discovery of the modern self.[53] Fichte the frustrated, under-placed philosopher eventually transformed himself into Fichte the modern individual. For our purposes in this book, however, it is significant that he wrote the "Open Call" and the *Reclamation* during the time when he was most deeply dissatisfied with his lot, for it is the growing sense of anger at the system's failure to include him that explains the dramatic change in tone between the two texts. The question remains, however, what sparked the actual change in position? Here we need to return to the politics of public debate.

If we are to understand Fichte's reversal on the edict, we must review the basic chronology of Woellner's policies. On 9 July 1788 Woellner promulgated the Edict on Religion and, in the process sparked both a large debate in print and serious resistance within the bureaucratic apparatus. It was with the bureaucratic resistance in mind that, on 19 December 1788, Woellner promulgated the Censorship Edict, which gave the government extensive powers to prohibit and punish print attacks on the government's policies. This one-two punch made many German elites fear for the future of their hard won print freedom —a reaction that from our perspective seems perfectly justified. There is, however, an issue that must be explored further: the German elite was not opposed to censorship per se. What the elite opposed was bad censorship, that is, the prohibition of speculative, academic works by stodgy defenders of orthodoxy, which is how Woellner and his associates came

[52] For a related interpretation, see Brunschwig, *Enlightenment and Romanticism*. In general, see La Vopa, *Grace, Talent, and Merit*.
[53] La Vopa, *Fichte*.

increasingly to be viewed. Hence, the Censorship Edict did not raise the specter of tutelage itself over the intellectual word —that had always been the reality— but of tutelage by the wrong sort.[54]

Judging by his words in the "Open Call" Fichte was not, initially, seriously concerned about the Edict on Religion. Granting the government broader and more exclusive powers of censorship was, however, another matter altogether. Here, let us return to the dates. In early 1792, Fichte was censored when trying to publish his book, *Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation*.[55] He did succeed in getting it published later in the same year, and it was this text that made Fichte famous enough to garner a professorship at the University of Jena.[56] One may expect that the experience of being censored had some effect on Fichte's attitude toward the Edict, although evidence from his correspondence suggests otherwise; in fact, Fichte seemed to take the matter in stride.[57] It may well be that being censored by other Gelehrten was such a common practice that Fichte saw the rejection as nothing more than the cost of doing business. Much more important, however, is what Fichte did not know when he wrote his original defense of the edict, namely that Woellner had also promulgated the Censorship Edict, which not only limited debate but also gave a great deal of power to people who had earned no respect in the public sphere.[58]

Now, let us return to Berlin, where by this point Woellner had surrounded himself with cronies who were, on balance, nothing more than religious obscurantists. A good example is the empowerment, in 1792, of a commission on orthodoxy that went under the name *Immediat-Examinations-Kommission*.[59] The members of the commission traveled around Prussia, interviewing preachers, professors and university students to ensure their orthodoxy. If this tactic already suggested a return to the hated Inquisition, it did not help that the commission's leaders were not well-respected scholars, but friends of Woellner. Indeed, in March 1794, when the commission tried to do its work at the University of Halle, a commotion (*ärgerlichen Tumult*) erupted when theology students gathered menacingly in front of the hotel where Woellner's agents were staying.[60] Only the intervention of university

---

[54] On the problem of censorship in eighteenth-century Germany, see Hellmuth, "Aufklärung und Pressefreiheit.", Günter Birtsch, "Die Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft," in *Über den Prozess der Aufklärung in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert: Personen, Institutionen und Medien*, ed. Hans Erich Bödeker and Ulrich Herrmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987).

[55] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung* (Königsberg: Hartung, 1792).

[56] Ibid, Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 180.

[57] Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 180, La Vopa, *Fichte*, 93.

[58] That only those who had achieved respect in public ought to be censors was a common theme in the contemporary literature published on the edict. On what Fichte knew and when he knew it, see Lauth and Jacob, eds., *GA*, I, 180. For an alternate explanation of Fichte's changing positions, see Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 78.

[59] Schwartz, *Der erste Kulturkampf* 172-214.

[60] GStAPK, "I. HA Rep. 96, Nr 222B, Eigenhändiger Schriften Woellners in Geistlichen Angelegenheiten, vol. I. 1788-1796 (M)", 79V-84R.

officials got the students to disperse. In the context of ever greater state intervention by the wrong sort, the generally accepted practices of tutelage came to seem more and more arbitrary and intrusive.[61]

Fichte's turn against the edict must, therefore, be understood as a response to the threat of excessive censorship against the elite. That this threat came at exactly the moment when his situation seemed least satisfying explains not only the abruptness of the turn but also its vehemence. When Woellner told preachers to tone down their religious speculation at the pulpit, this represented, for many, traditional enlightened practice.[62] However, when he extended his efforts to include people who had every reason to expect not to be told what to do, blowback was the result. Noting the significance of the Censorship Edict to Fichte's *Reclamation* does not, of course, exclude the influence of other factors on his development, and we should make certain to recognize the most historically significant among them. It is clear, for example, that Fichte's reading of Kantian philosophy deeply affected his view of autonomy and the rights of reason.[63] Kant's emphasis on a realm of choice that existed independent of the unbreakable laws of nature as posited by Isaac Newton provided Fichte with philosophical underpinnings for his conception of freedom. Moreover, the events on the other side of the Rhine after 1789 can only have augmented his sense that traditional measures of social control belonged to the *ancien régime*. The point here is that Fichte's turn against the edict cannot be understood without additional reference to the long established "enlightened" practices that shaped his worldview. As we will see, although Fichte reacted against "enlightened" tutelage, he did not reject the broader social assumptions on which it had been based.

We can trace the persistence of the three big themes that we have been pursuing (conscience, Protestantism, neo-corporatism) through an examination of two texts that Fichte wrote early in the nineteenth century, On the Essence of the Gelehrter and His Appearance in the Domain of Freedom (1806) and On the Only Possible Disruption of Academic Freedom (1812).[64] The first text constitutes a series of mediations on what the Gelehrter must do and believe in order to be worthy of the name. The second is the published version of an address that Fichte gave in 1811, as the rector at the new University of Berlin. Both these texts show how Fichte appropriated traditional "enlightened" themes and then applied them to a

[61] On Woellner's the rise to power of Woellner's chief associates/henchmen, see Schwartz, *Der erste Kulturkampf* 172-214.

[62] For similar interpretation, Hunter, "Kant's *Religion* and Prussian Religious Policy". For an alternate view, see Lestition, "Kant ".

[63] La Vopa, *Fichte*.

[64] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit. In öffentlichen Vorlesungen gehalten zu Erlangen, im Sommer Halbjahre 1805* (Berlin: Himburgischen Buchhandlung, 1806), ———, "Ueber die enzig mögliche Störung der akademischen Freiheit," in *Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Johann H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit, 1845-46).

new political and social context in a way that privileged the Gelehrten even more.

Before we can consider these two texts, however, we must note another political clash that probably intensified Fichte's critical view of censorship and state power, his dismissal from the University of Jena.[65] After achieving celebrity in late 1792 with his *Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation*, a text that everyone originally assumed Immanuel Kant to have written, Fichte was called to Jena, where he occupied the chair in Critical Philosophy that had become vacant upon the death of Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Fichte was active in Jena, publishing widely and developing his own system, which, although derived from that of Kant, differed with it in important respects.[66] This period of scholarly production came to an abrupt end in 1799, however, with the so-called *Atheismusstreit* (Atheism Conflict).

The details of the *Atheismusstreit* need not detain us here. The most significant facts for our purposes are as follows. In 1798, an anonymous pamphlet published in Nuremberg charged that two speculative essays that had appeared in Philosophical Journal of a Society of German Scholars openly supported atheism.[67] This journal was, at best, obscure, but was published in Saxony and co-edited by none other than Fichte. When the Saxon court heard of the changes it ordered that all the offending issues be confiscated and launched an investigation that ended in Fichte's dismissal. Fichte did not drape himself in glory during the investigation, quashing all possibility of compromise by repeatedly making a spectacle of himself. In doing so, he even managed to turn some members of the German elite against him, including Johann W. Goethe, who had been working intensely behind the scenes to defuse the crisis and was, in the end, all but relieved to be rid of this troublesome philosopher. The result was that Fichte left Jena almost unlamented.

The significance of the *Atheismusstreit* lies in the way it echoed the problems that Fichte had already declaimed against in the *Reclamation*. Once again, state power was constraining the boundaries of his free of thought. Hence, when Fichte eventually found refuge in the Prussian capital, he was left in a most peculiar situation: he had come to abhor state interference in his work, but was also grateful to have the Prussian state's countenance. How would Fichte find his way out of this cul-de-sac? Fichte's *Essence* is, thus, an attempt to re-found intellectual freedom within Prussia's monarchical and enlightened traditions, but with respect to the new political situation that

[65] For full coverage of the *Atheismusstreit*, see La Vopa, *Fichte*, 368-424. from which this discussion is drawn.
[66] His most significant work in this context is the *Wissenschaftslehre*, in which he expounded his own unique philosophical system. On the nature of the shift from Kant to Fichte, see Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*.
[67] La Vopa, *Fichte*, 368-401.

both he and Germany as a whole confronted.[68] The text consisted of ten lectures he had read to students in 1805, while teaching briefly at the Prussian University of Erlangen. Taken together, these lectures unify the three broad themes that we have been pursuing, but only after being reformulated by Fichte in a way that made intellectual freedom more corporatist than ever.

The *Essence* is a study in how conscience could be used as a means for social distinction. Let us start with Fichte's definition of the *Gelehrter*, a person who has the ability to understand the idea of God (*gottliche Idee*).[69] There is, no doubt, an important philosophical context to this approach to God. The point here is not to exclude the philosophical backdrop, but to show how Fichte's views also fit into and emerge from the late eighteenth-century social world of the educated elite. The world of academia was already socially exclusive in the late eighteenth century. However, with this particular definition Fichte made it even more exclusionary, because he ejected people who were educated but, in his view, were unable to reach the heights that he expected of a *Gelehrter*.[70] Given what we have argued above, we can see how Fichte continued the long-standing "enlightened" attack against Lutheran orthodoxy, as the most likely people to be defined as uneducated *Gelehrten* were orthodox Lutherans who were too tied to the religious texts to understand anything more elevated.[71] Moreover, the creeping corporatism that Fichte espoused also had deep roots within the German university system itself, in so far as universities were more than willing to accept new privileges, as they fought to protect existing ones.[72] The end result of Fichte's contribution to this battle was that the intellectual world became more exclusive. Consider his definition of those people that have failed to reach Fichte's heights:

> And so we have said: he who has not come to know the Idea of God trough academic self-fashioning (*gelehrte Bildung*), or does not aspire to this

68 Whatever flaws it had, Prussia was relatively well managed and did have a lively intellectual scene. On government, see Behrens, *Society, Government, and the Enlightenment*. On intellectual climate, see Ursula Goldenbaum, "Der 'Berolinismus': Die preussische Hauptstadt als ein Zentrum geistiger Kommunikation in Deutschland", in *Aufklärung in Berlin*, ed. Wolfgang Förster (Berlin [East]: Akademie-Verlag, 1989). On the diversity of enlightened thought, see Franklin Kopitzsch, "Die Aufklärung in Deutschland. Zu ihren Leistungen, Grenzen und Wirkungen", *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 23 (1983). On Prussia and the Napoleonic Wars, Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866 : Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (München: C.H. Beck, 1983), 11-68.

69 Fichte, *Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten*, 4-5.

70 Fichte highlights the completion of an important eighteenth century trend. See Grimm, "Vom Schulfuchs zum Menschheitslehrer".

71 This issue is separate from but, nonetheless, related to Fichte's philosophical opposition to dogmatism. See Lance P. Hickey, "Fichte's Critique of Dogmatism: The Modern Parallel",*The Philosophical Forum* 35, no. 1 (2004).

72 On education and German universities, see McClelland, *State, society, and university in Germany, 1700-1914*, Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*, 136-42. For a discussion of the schools that served the common folk, see Eugene N. Anderson, "Die preussische Volksschule im neunzehnten Jahrhundert", in *Modern Preussische Geschichte, 1648-1947: Eine Anthologie*, ed. Otto Busch and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981). One cannot understand the sense of difference that the *Gelehrten* acquired without recognizing the inherent limits in the school reforms of the eighteenth century. Melton, *Absolutism*, 152-59.

> knowledge, is in actual fact nothing. And later we said: he is a dilettante (*Stümper*).[73]

The belief in academic merit had a dark underbelly, ever greater social exclusion, or to gloss Fichte's words, anyone who could not see as far or as clearly as a *Gelehrter* was by definition nothing (*gar nichts*). Hence, the *Gelehrten* were not merely figuratively above everyone else, they were entitled by their intellectual prowess to the privileges pertaining to a separate order (*Stand*), for without such privileges, *they* could never be free. Here is Fichte explaining to the students the context in which this freedom must exist:

> Indeed, instruction in ethical, respectable, and penetrating concepts in general would be taught to you, good examples would surround you, and your teachers would be not only thoroughgoing *Gelehrten* but also constitute an assortment of the best people in the nation.[74]

Moreover, because academics are all people of quality, students included, Fichte then added, "For these people punitive laws would be very rare."[75] The best of the nation needed few laws, a position consistent with much of the enlightened rhetoric we have seen thus far. From this essentially eighteenth-century perspective, being a Gelehrter meant being beyond the oversight that the state imposed on the rest of the population.

Fichte had not yet reached the pinnacle of his academic career, when he wrote the *Essence*. That moment came with his accession as rector at the newly founded University of Berlin, a jewel of the great Prussian reform movement.[76] Fichte took office amidst great fanfare and read to the gathered community a text that defined his vision of academic freedom. This text was later published, but it is important to frame our analysis of Fichte's ideas by recognizing that it began as, in effect, a private talk within the academic corporation. Hence, Fichte's words lay bare for us the corporate vision of the *Gelehrter* and his mission within German culture. Let us begin with Fichte's definition of a university:

> The university is the visible embodiment of the immortality of our human race, as it allows nothing truly existing (*wahrhaft Seyendes*) to pass away....in the University all division between the other worldly and the worldly is repealed. The university is the visible embodiment of the unity of the world, of the appearance of God and of God himself.[77]

---

73 Fichte, *Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten*, 20.
74 Ibid., 132.
75 Ibid.
76 On the reform period, see Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866 : Bürgerwelt und starker Staat*, 33-68.
77 Fichte, "Ueber die enzig mögliche Störung der akademischen Freiheit", 453.

We need no clearer example of the religious energy that still coursed through Fichte's approach to academia than this. Indeed, it is no accident that academic study became a calling (*Beruf*) for Fichte, as study and contemplation offered the only path to the idea of God. On the one hand, the absolute freedom of conscience had been transferred in its fullest sense to those living and working within the university. On the other, if we reflect these words back onto the speaker, we see that Fichte has anointed himself a new *pontifex maximus*, in so far as the institution he led bridged the gap between the real world and the semi-religious ideal one. In this context, it is no surprise that Fichte called for absolute academic freedom:

> Therefore, a university must from this point onward be left to its own devices, if it is to fulfill its purpose and, in fact, be what it purports to be. It rightly needs and demands from the outside complete freedom, that is academic freedom in the broadest sense of the term.[78]

Fichte could speak in absolutes, since academic freedom, like freedom of conscience, had always been delimited in the German tradition. Professors and students were Prussian subjects, which meant that their freedom was founded on the monarch's laws, many of which they had helped to write.[79] They were, therefore, entitled to think freely, because they understood the limits of civil freedom and knew how to behave in public.

The social exclusion that lurked at the heart of so much eighteenth-century rhetoric is apparent here in the emphasis on academic merit. Members of Fichte's club—students included—were august individuals and deserved to be subject to a completely different set of rules. For example, Fichte understood the freedom of students thus:

> The student order (*Stand*) should have a right to everything that is forbidden both legally and morally to other orders, exactly because it is forbidden to them, as only through this [measure] will the exclusionary nature (*das Ausschliessende*) of the law be demonstrated.[80]

Fichte used his social prestige to justify a legally constituted and privileged order from which others were excluded through their lack of merit. Moreover, the corporate ethos of this arrangement is evident in Fichte's description of the process of expulsion. Once in the club, it was necessary for the student to obey all the rules that governed his conduct, or be subject to corporate discipline, which would look like this:

---

[78] Ibid., 454.
[79] Ibid., 455.
[80] Ibid., 459.

> under the likewise entirely natural penalty, in the case of infraction, to be excluded from the Student order, to be banished, and to be judged and treated as dishonest.[81]

Fichte's vision of academic freedom represents the distilled essence of the exclusionist instinct that emerged from elite culture. Conscience, Protestantism, and meritocratic neo-corporatism combined with Fichte's own social angst to create an approach to academic freedom, in which those who did not make the fullest use of the freedoms to which they were entitled were marginalized not merely as less intelligent beings, but also as beings without honor. Germany's late eighteenth-century world of educated peacocks had been transformed into a revivified academic guild.

Humboldt and the Edict on Religion

Before taking leave of the issues that Fichte's response to the edict raises, let us examine another unpublished reply to the edict on religion, Wilhelm von Humboldt's "Über Religion".[82] Written in 1789, this text is a classic example of an "enlightened" attitude toward religion, in so far as it sees religious education and contemplation in fundamentally pedagogical terms. For Humboldt, religion had ceased being a means of control, by the eighteenth century, and was now a means for personal cultivation (Bildung). This association of religion with Bildung was intimately connected with Humboldt's way of evaluating historical progress, that is, through the expansion of people's freedom to develop their individual capacities. As people became more cultivated (gebildet), the state could ever-so-gently remove the controls that had once legitimately limited their freedom. One may think that this impelled Humboldt to argue for general autonomy. Nonetheless, his vision of progress remained tempered by the requirement that people demonstrate their readiness for freedom, which meant that his theory of progress also served as a justification for limiting freedom.

Humboldt was not against all social control and opposed that interference that was inappropriate for a person or group's demonstrated level of cultivation. Consider this careful assessment:

> Everything depends not only on the diversity of the character, but also on the diversity of the soul's moods in the different stages of life. One should not judge an action before one has examined exactly the physical, intellectual, and moral capacities of the actor. That this measure is only important where it applies to the regulation of inner moral worth, not where one considers

---

[81] Ibid., 461.
[82] Humboldt, "Über Religion." For a different reading of this text, see Paul Sweet, "Young Wilhelm Von Humboldt's Writings (1789-93) Reconsidered", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 34, no. 3 (1973): 472.

> completely different, external ends, and that there are general cases that, for the most part, suggest great or minimal moral value deserves, not for the first time, to be remembered.[83]

Humboldt's argument exemplifies the deep tensions within the conscience-laden worldview that we discussed in detail above.[84] In the first two sentences, he offered a qualified defense of freedom in the moral realm and did not argue against the state's right to censure independent thought, believing instead that it should check whether such independence posed a danger before turning against it.

The idea that a people's behavior needed to be evaluated before limiting their freedoms grew out of the major themes that we have pursued this far. First, consistent with the existing doctrine of conscience, Humboldt argued that each person was guaranteed a certain quantity of moral freedom. Second, since not everyone could handle the same freedoms distinctions had to be drawn between people. The most fundamental implication of this position is that some people, even some peoples, could be judged unworthy of the freedoms that others, like Humboldt, had a right to enjoy. Hence:

> What I have said here of individual people can also be applied to entire Nations. The different levels of their cultivation must be judged according to the different capacities that have most fully developed themselves within their souls.[85]

Although this is not necessarily a Protestant perspective, it is deeply elitist, and the justification it offers for judging an entire people unworthy of freedom had troubling implications for identifiable and segregated populations, such as early-modern Jews.[86] However, this perspective also justified the evaluation of individuals as individuals. Along these lines, Humboldt went on to write:

> There are natures, in which such fervent consequences of all ideas and sensations rule, that possess such a depth of ideas and feelings, from which such strength and independence emanate, and which neither demand nor allow devotion of the entire being to another being or power, which is how religion's influence is normally manifest.[87]

---

83 Humboldt, "Über Religion", I, 16.

84 Andrew Valls notes the difference between Humboldt and Mill's understanding of the liberal state and traces it to the divergent approaches to self-formation. This essay accepts the reality of this divergence but puts it into an eighteenth-century context that expressly includes conscience. Andrew Valls, "Self-Development and the Liberal State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill and Wilhelm von Humboldt", *The Review of Politics* 61, no. 2 (1999): 252-53.

85 Humboldt, "Über Religion", I, 17.

86 On the relationship between the German Enlightenment and the problem of Jewish segregation, see Sorkin, *Transformation*, David Jan Sorkin, *The Berlin Haskalah and German Religious Thought: Orphans of Knowledge*, Parkes-Wiener Series on Jewish Studies (London Vallentine Mitchell, 2000).

87 Humboldt, "Über Religion", I, 23.

According to Humboldt the freest spirits among us are to be celebrated, not feared, since they —like Frederick II— have the strength to live beyond religion. Such people were so cultivated, however, that they would behave in public in way that was consistent with the needs of the state and society. These are the educated elite (*Gelehrten*), and with their abilities in mind, the state needed only to learn when intervention was appropriate.

Humboldt's response to the edict amounted to a call for freedom for those who had earned it. He may have disagreed with Woellner's edict, but he did so *within* a set of assumptions about the value of political stability and the role of conscience that he shared with his more fractious contemporary, Fichte. This commonality existed even though Humboldt and Fichte cannot easily be lumped together. Both were young when the Edict on Religion was promulgated (Humboldt was 21), but Humboldt was also born a noble and, for that reason, never confronted the social angst that plagued Fichte, which may account for the less strident tone of his essay. Nonetheless, this scion of a very old Prussian family also understood that to be "enlightened" in the late eighteenth century was to be aware of the differences between the elite and mass.[88] In this context it is significant that Humboldt was a major force behind the founding of the University of Berlin, an institution devoted wholly to research (*Forschung*), because his vision for the university helped to institutionalize the social and political attitudes of the German Enlightenment.[89] Together with his colleagues who instituted the *Abitur* (School-leaving Examination), Humboldt made certain that the *Gelehrten* constituted a narrow corporation that had its own rules and rituals.[90] Like Fichte, he made the educated world safe for the freedom that the Enlightenment had promised.

88 Humboldt was well aware that good citizens were a product of education, see Georg Kotowski, "Wilhelm von Humboldt und die deutsche Universität", in *Moderne Preussische Geschichte, 1648-1947: Eine Anthologie*, ed. Otto Büsch and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 1362.

89 *Ibid.*

90 For an exhaustive discussion of Prussia's educational systema and the *Abitur*, see Paul Schwartz, *Die Gelehrtenschulen Preussens unter dem Oberschulkollegium (1787-1806) und das Abiturientenexamen*, 3 vols., Monumenta Germaniae Paedogogica (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1910-1912). See also Anthony J. La Vopa, *Prussian Schoolteachers: Profession and Office, 1763-1848* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

Conclusion

Whatever other contexts may have influenced Fichte's thoughts on personal and academic freedom, this essay has shown they can be read and understood as, in part, products of the Edict on Religion. The significance of this interpretive position lies in the intellectual continuity it identifies between the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. Fichte transformed the social anxieties that were pregnant within Germany's "official" enlightenment and, in the process, dragged forward conscience, Protestantism, and meritocratic neo-corporatism into the nineteenth century. These themes existed in a new context, of course, but remain recognizable as eighteenth-century holdovers. Indeed, Fichte helped to ensure that these attitudes would far outlive the original context that had created them, as the myth of the free university and the concomitant identification of university study as a calling created a privileged set of thinkers that Fritz Ringer long ago identified as "German Mandarins".[91] The sanctification of the educated person, the sense of social difference, the establishment of a privileged academic order ran through the German academic community until at least 1945.

Although he did not like the Censorship Edict, and wrote against it, Fichte did not break with the German Enlightenment as much as he fulfilled it. Social control was never far beneath the surface of the academic culture that was cultivated by the *Gelehrten* and the apotheosis of an elite culture as an autonomous realm in Fichte's notion of the university merely reinforced the entire "enlightened" program. In 1807, when Fichte read his *Addresses to the German Nation* to eager German students in French-occupied Berlin, he was doing more than soothing the hurt feelings of a conquered nation; he was also asserting the rightful preeminence of the educated class within German society. Many have recognized the historical significance of Fichte's speaking for the nation.[92] Indeed, the fame he garnered from the speech contributed to the decision to make him rector at the university. Nonetheless, that he felt confident enough in his status as a *Gelehrter* to separate himself out from his fellow Germans and to speak to them as a group shows us the dizzying heights to which his social prejudices had lifted him: the secular *pontifex maximus* had become the prophet of a new religion.

[91] Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: the German Academic Community, 1890-1933* (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1969).
[92] Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 97-99.

References

Anderson, Eugene N., (1981), "Die preussische Volksschule im neunzehnten Jahrhundert". In *Modern Preussische Geschichte, 1648-1947: Eine Anthologie*, ed. O. Busch and W. Neugebauer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Andrew, Edward G., (2001), *Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and Modern Subjectivity*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Beck, Hermann, (1992), "The Social Policies of Prussian Officials: The Bureaucracy in a New Light". *The Journal of Modern History* 64 (2):263-98.

Behrens, C. B. A., (1985), Society, Government, and the Enlightenment: the Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia. London: Thames and Hudson.

Beiser, Frederick C., (1987), The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———, (1992), Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: the Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790-1800. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Birtsch, Günter., (1987), "Die Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft". In Über den Prozess der Aufklärung in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert: Personen, Institutionen und Medien, ed. H. E. Bödeker and U. Herrmann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

———, (1999), "Reform Absolutism and the Codification of Law: The Genesis and Nature of the Prussian General Code (1794)". In *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany*, ed. J. Brewer and E. Hellmuth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bödeker, Hans Erich., (1989), "Die Religiösität der Gebildeten". *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung* 11:145-95.

———, (2002), "The Concept of the Republic in Eighteenth-Century German Thought". In *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750-1850*, ed. J. Heideking, J. A. Henretta and P. Becker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boehart, William, (1992), "Politik und Religion: Prolegomena zu der Kontroverse zwischen Johan Melchior Goeze und Julius Gustav Alberti über das Busstagsgebet in Hamburg (1769)". In *Das Volks als Objekt obrigkeitlichen Handelns*, ed. R. Vierhaus. Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag.

Breazeale, Daniel, (1993), "Fichte and Schilling: the Jena period". In *The Age of German Idealism*, ed. R. C. Solomon and K. M. Higgins. London Routledge.

Brunschwig, Henri, (1974), *Enlightenment and Romanticism in Eighteenth-Century Prussia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dann, Otto, (2002), "Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750-1850". In *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750-1850*, ed. J. Heideking, J. A. Henretta and P. Becker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eisenstein, Elizabeth, (1968), "Some Conjectures about the Impact of Printing on Western Society and Thought: A Preliminary Report". *Journal of Modern History* 40 (1):1-56.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, (1792), Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung. Königsberg: Hartung.
———, (1806), Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit. In öffentlichen Vorlesungen gehalten zu Erlangen, im Sommer Halbjahre 1805. Berlin: Himburgischen Buchhandlung.
———, (1845-46), "Ueber die enzig mögliche Störung der akademischen Freiheit". In *Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. J. H. Fichte. Berlin: Veit.
———, (1967), "Zuruf an die Bewohner der preussischen Staaten veranlasst durch die freimüthigen Betrachtungen und ehrerbietigen Vorstellungen über die neuen preussischen Anordnungen in geistlichen Sachen". In *J. G. Fichte--Gesamtausgabe Der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, ed. R. Lauth and H. Jacob. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag.
———, (1793), *Zurückforderung der Denkfreiheit von den Fürsten Europens, die sie bisher unterdrückten*. Heliopolis.
Fischer, K., (1875), "Fichte, Johann Gottlieb". In *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, ed. R. W. Liliencron, F. X. v. Wegele, A. Bettelheim and F. Gerlich. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
Gerth, Hans H., (1976), *Bürgerliche Intelligenz um 1800: zur Soziologie d. dt. Frühliberalismus*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Goldenbaum, Ursula, (1989), "Der 'Berolinismus': Die preussische Hauptstadt als ein Zentrum geistiger Kommunikation in Deutschland". In *Aufklärung in Berlin*, ed. W. Förster. Berlin (East): Akademie-Verlag.
Grimm, Gunter E., (1987), "Vom Schulfuchs zum Menschheitslehrer". In *Über den Prozess der Aufklärung in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert: Personen, Institutionen und Medien*, ed. H. E. Bödeker and U. Herrmann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
GStAPK, "I. HA Rep. 96, Nr 222B, Eigenhändiger Schriften Woellners in Geistlichen Angelegenheiten", vol. I. 1788-1796 (M).
Hammerstein, Notker, (1983), "Die deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter der Aufklärung". *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 10 (1):73-89.
Hellmuth, Eckhart, (1982), "Aufklärung und Pressefreiheit. Zur Debatte der Berliner Mittwochgesellschaft während der Jahre 1783 und 1784". *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 9 (2):315-45.
Hickey, Lance P., (2004), "Fichte's Critique of Dogmatism: The Modern Parallel". *The Philosophical Forum* 35 (1):65-80.
Hintze, Otto, (1975), "Prussian Reform Movements Before 1806". In *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. F. Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press.
Houston, R. A., (1988), *Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500-1800*. London: Longman.
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, (1960), "Über Religion". In *Wilhelm von Humboldt: Werke in Fünf Bänden*, ed. A. Flitner and K. Giel. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung.
Hunter, Ian, (2001), *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early-Modern Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———, (2005), "Kant's *Religion* and Prussian Religious Policy". *Modern Intellectual History* 2:1-27.

Kittsteiner, Heinz D., (1990), *Gewissen und Geschichte: Studien zur Entstehung des moralischen Bewusstseins*. Heidelberg: Manutius.

———, (1992), *Die Entstehung des Modernen Gewissens*. Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Insel Verlag.

Klippel, Diethelm, (1999), "Reasonable Aims of Civil Society: Concerns of the State in German Political Theory in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries". In *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany*, ed. J. Brewer and E. Hellmuth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knudsen, Jonathan B., (1986), *Justus Möser and the German Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kopitzsch, Franklin, (1983), "Die Aufklärung in Deutschland. Zu ihren Leistungen, Grenzen und Wirkungen". *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 23:1-21.

Koselleck, Reinhart., (1959), *Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt*. Baden-Baden: Suhrkamp.

Kotowski, Georg, (1981), "Wilhelm von Humboldt und die deutsche Universität". In *Moderne Preussische Geschichte, 1648-1947: Eine Anthologie*, ed. O. Büsch and W. Neugebauer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Krieger, Leonard, (1957), *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

La Vopa, Anthony J., (1980), Prussian Schoolteachers: Profession and Office, 1763-1848. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.

———, (1988), Grace, Talent, and Merit: Poor Students, Clerical Careers, and Professional Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Germany. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

———, (1989), "The Revelatory Moment: Fichte and the French Revolution". *Central European History* 22 (2):130-59.

———, (1990), "The Politics of Enlightenment: Friedrich Gedike and German Professional Ideology". *The Journal of Modern History* 62 (1):34-56.

———, (1999), "The Philosopher and the Schwärmer: On the Career of a German Epithet from Luther to Kant". *Huntington Library Quarterly* 60 (1&2):85-115.

———, (2001), *Fichte: the Self and the Calling of Philosophy, 1762-1799*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laursen, John Christian, Hans Blom and Luisa Simonutti, eds., (2007), *Monarchists and Monarchism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Lauth, Reinhard and Hans Jacob, eds., (1967), *J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe Der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Vol. 2. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag.

Lauth, Reinharth and Hans Jacob, eds., (1964), *J. G. Fichte--Gesamtausgabe Der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Vol. I. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Günther Holzboog).

Lestition, Steven, (1993), "Kant and the End of Enlightenment in Prussia". *Journal of Modern History* 65:57-112.

Levinger, Matthew, (2000), Enlightened Nationalism: the Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848 Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Manheim, Ernst, (1979), Aufklärung und öffentliche Meinung. Studien zur Soziologie der Öffentlichkeit im 18. Jahrhundert. Edited by R. v. Dülmen. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
McClelland, Charles E., (1980), *State, society, and university in Germany, 1700-1914*. Cambridge; New York :: Cambridge University Press.
———, (2000), "Structural Change and Social Reproduction in German Universities, 1870-1920". In *History of Education: Major Themes*, ed. R. Lowe. London: Routledge.
Melton, James van Horn, (1979), "From Enlightenment to Revolution: Hertzberg, Schlözer, and the Problem of Despotism in the Late Aufklärung". *Central European History* XII (2):103-23.
———, (1988), Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.
Nipperdey, Thomas, (1983), Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat. München: C.H. Beck.
Reill, Peter Hanns, (1975), *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Reiss, Hans, ed., (1991), *Kant's Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ringer, Fritz, (1969), The Decline of the German Mandarins: the German Academic Community, 1890-1933 Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.
Rockmore, Tom, (1980), Fichte, Marx and the German Philosophical Tradition. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
Rönnberg, Jakob Friedrich, (1789), *Ueber Symbolische Bücher im Bezug aufs Staatsrecht*. Rostock and Leipzig: Johann Benjamin Georg Fleischer.
Roper, Lyndal and R. W. Scribner, (2001), *Religion and Culture in Germany (1400–1800)*. Leiden: Brill.
Ruggiero, Guido De and R. G. Collingwood, (1959), *The History of European Liberalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Sabean, David Warren, (1984), Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.
Sauter, Christina M., (1989), Wilhelm von Humboldt und die deutsche Aufklärung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Scott, H. M., ed., (1990), *Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press.
Scribner, R. W., (1986), "Incombustible Luther: The Image of the Reformer in Early Modern Europe". *Past & Present* 110:38-68.
Schmidt, James, (1995), "Civil Society and Social Things: Setting the Boundaries of the Social Sciences". *Social Research* 62:902-32.
Schwartz, Paul, (1910-1912), Die Gelehrtenschulen Preussens unter dem Oberschulkollegium (1787-1806) und das Abiturientenexamen. 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.
———, (1925), Der erste Kulturkampf in Preussen um Kirche und Schule (1788-1798). Berlin: Weidmann.
Sheehan, James J., (1989), *German History, 1770-1866*. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Sorkin, David Jan, (1987), *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sparn, Walter, (1989), "Auf dem Wege zur theologischen Aufklärung in Halle: von Johann Franz Budde zu Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten". *Zentren der Aufklärung I, Halle: Aufklärung und Pietismus* 15:71-89.

Stroup, John, (1984), The struggle for identity in the clerical estate : Northwest German Protestant opposition to Absolutist policy in the eighteenth century. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Sweet, Paul, (1973), "Young Wilhelm Von Humboldt's Writings (1789-93) Reconsidered". Journal of the History of Ideas 34 (3):469-82.

Trapp, Ernst Christian, (1791), Freymüthige Betrachtungen und ehrerbietige Vorstellungen über die neuen Preussischen Anordnungen in geistlichen Sachen. Germanien [Braunschweig]: [Schulbuchhandlung].

Valjavec, Fritz, (1951), Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland 1770–1815 Munich: R. Oldenbourg.

Valls, Andrew, (1999), "Self-Development and the Liberal State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill and Wilhelm von Humboldt". *The Review of Politics* 61 (2):251-74.

Van Kley, Dale K., (1996), The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Vann, James Allen, (1984), The Making of a State: Württemberg, 1593-1793. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Zeeden, Ernst Walter, (1954), The Legacy of Luther: Martin Luther and the Reformation in the Estimation of the German Lutherans from Luther's Death to the Beginning of the Age of Goethe. Translated by R. M. Bethell. London: Hollis & Carter.

Zimmermann, Johann Georg, (1788), Ueber Friedrich den Grossen und meine Unterredungen mit Ihm kurz vor seinem Tode. Leipzig: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

Novedades

División de Administración Pública

Casar, Ma. Amparo, *La cultura política de los políticos en el México democrático*, DTAP-193

Arellano, David y Lepore Walter, *Economic Growth and Institutions: The Influence of External Actors*, DTAP-194

Casar, Ma. Amparo, *Los gobiernos sin mayoría en México: 1997-2006*, DTAP-195

De Angoitia, Regina, *La evolución de los portales del gobierno federal: la experiencia de ocho dependencias*, DTAP-196

Cabrero, Enrique, *De la descentralización como aspiración a la descentralización como problema*, DTAP-197

Sour, Laura y Eunises Rosillo, *¿Cuáles son los resultados del presupuesto por resultados?*, DTAP-198

Arellano, David y Walter Lepore, *Prevención y control de conflictos de interés: lecciones para la Administración Pública Federal en México…*, DTAP-199

Sour, Laura y Fredy Girón, *El efecto flypaper de las transferencias intergubernamentales del ramo 28…*, DTAP-200

Mariscal, Judith, *Convergencia tecnológica y armonización regulatoria en México: una evaluación de los instrumentos regulatorios*, DTAP-201

Mariscal, Judith, *Market Structure in the Latin American Mobile Sector*, DTAP-202

División de Economía

Elbittar, Alexander, Rodrigo Harrison y Roberto Muñoz, *Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study*, DTE-405

Carreón, Víctor y Malena Svarch, *Impacto del crédito en el bienestar*, DTE-406

Cermeño, Rodolfo, *Median-Unbiased Estimation in Panel Data…*, DTE-407

Unger, Kurt, *Apertura y empleos: la economía de los sectores comerciables y no comerciables de las regiones de México*, DTE-408

Gómez Aurora y Aldo Musacchio, *Public Finance, Foreign Creditors, and the Costs of the Mexican Revolution*, DTE-409

Gómez, Aurora, *Networks and Entrepreneurship: The Modernization of Textile Production and Distribution in Porfirian Mexico*, DTE-410

Gómez Aurora y Rodrigo Parral, *La revolución mexicana y la creación y disolución de las empresas*, DTE-411

Gómez, Aurora, *From Company Stores to Consumer's Cooperatives and the Worker's Bank in the Orizaba Valley Textile Milles*, DTE-412

Gómez, Aurora y César Guerrero, *To Open or Not to Open: The Causes, Timing and Consequences of Protectionism*, DTE-413

Scott, John, *Salud, sistemas de salud y pobreza: una síntesis de la literatura*, DTE-414

DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES

Ortiz Mena, Antonio y Fagan Drew, *Relating to the Powerful One: Canada and Mexico's Trade and Investment Relations with the United States*, DTEI-158
Schiavon, Jorge, *Política exterior y opinión pública: México ante el mundo*, DTEI-159
Sotomayor, Arturo, *Los métodos cualitativos en la ciencia política contemporánea*, DTEI-160
González, Guadalupe, *Democratización y política exterior: ¿el fin del predominio presidencial?*, DTEI-161
González, Guadalupe, *Percepciones sociales sobre la migración en México y Estados Unidos: ¿hay espacios para cooperar?*, DTEI-162
Bernhard, William y David Leblang, *Standing Tall When the Wind Shifts: Financial Market Responses to Elections, Disasters and Terrorist Attacks*, DTEI-163
Velázquez, Rafael, *La relación entre el Ejecutivo y el Congreso en materia de política exterior durante el sexenio de Vicente Fox…*, DTEI-164
Ruano, Lorena, *De la exaltación al tedio: las relaciones entre México y la Unión Europea…*, DTEI-165
Martínez, Ferrán e Ignacio Lago Peñas, *Why new Parties? Changes in the number of Parties over time within Countries*, DTEI-166
Sotomayor, Arturo, *México y la ONU en momentos de transición: entre el activismo internacional, parálisis interna y crisis internacional*, DTEI-167

DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS

López, Sergio y Posadas Alejandro, *Las pruebas de daño e interés público en materia de acceso a la información. Una perspectiva comparada,* DTEJ-18
Magaloni, Ana Laura, *¿Cómo estudiar el derecho desde una perspectiva dinámica?*, DTEJ-19
Fondevila, Gustavo, *Cumplimiento de normativa y satisfacción laboral: un estudio de impacto en México*, DTEJ-20
Posadas, Alejandro, *La educación jurídica en el CIDE (México). El adecuado balance entre la innovación y la tradición*, DTEJ-21
Ingram, Matthew C., *Judicial Politics in the Mexican States: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations*, DTEJ-22
Fondevila, Gustavo e Ingram Matthew, *Detención y uso de la fuerza*, DTEJ-23
Magaloni, Ana Laura y Ana María Ibarra Olguín, *La configuración jurisprudencial de los derechos fundamentales…*, DTEJ-24
Magaloni, Ana Laura, *¿Por qué la Suprema Corte no ha sido un instrumento para la defensa de derechos fundamentales?*, DTEJ-25
Magaloni, Ana Laura, *Arbitrariedad e ineficiencia de la procuración de justicia: dos caras de la misma moneda*, DTEJ-26
Ibarra, Ana María, *Los artificios de la Dogmática Jurídica*, DTEJ-27

División de Estudios Políticos

Lehoucq, Fabrice, *Policymaking, Parties and Institutions in Democratic Costa Rica*, DTEP-192

Benton, Allyson, *Do Investors Assess the Credibility of Campaign Commitments? The Case of Mexico's 2006 Presidential Race*, DTEP-193

Nacif, Benito, *Para entender las instituciones políticas del México democrático*, DTEP-194

Lehoucq, Fabrice, *Why is Structural Reform Stangnating in Mexico? Policy Reform Episodes from Salinas to Fox*, DTEP-195

Benton, Allyson, *Latin America's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves: The Case of Mexico*, DTEP-196

Hacker, Casiano y Jeffrey Thomas, *An Antitrust Theory of Group Recognition*, DTEP-197

Hacker, Casiano y Jeffrey Thomas, *Operationalizing and Reconstructing the Theory of Nationalism*, DTEP-198

Langston, Joy y Allyson Benton, *"A ras de suelo": Candidate Appearances and Events in Mexico's Presidential Campaign*, DTEP-199

Negretto, Gabriel, *The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments…*, DTEP-200

Langston, Joy, *Hasta en las mejores familias: Madrazo and the PRI in the 2006 Presidential Elections*, DTEP-201

División de Historia

Meyer, Jean, *La Iglesia católica de los Estados Unidos frente al conflicto religioso en México, 1914-1920*, DTH-43

Barrón, Luis, *Revolucionarios sí, pero Revolución no*, DTH-44

Pipitone, Ugo, *Oaxaca: comunidad, instituciones, vanguardias*, DTH-45

Barrón, Luis, *Venustiano Carranza: un político porfiriano en la Revolución*, DTH-46

Tenorio, Mauricio y Laurencio Sanguino, *Orígenes de una ciudad mexicana: Chicago y la ciencia del* Mexican Problem *(1900-1930)*, DTH-47

Rojas, Rafael, *José María Heredia y la tradición republicana*, DTH-48

Rojas, Rafael, *Traductores de la libertad: el americanismo de los primeros republicanos*, DTH-49

Sánchez, Mónica Judith, *History* vs. *the Eternal Present or Liberal Individualism and the Morality of Compassion and Trust*, DTH-50

Medina, Luis, *Salida: los años de Zedillo*, DTH-51

Sauter, Michael, *The Edict on Religion of 1788 and the Statistics of Public Discussion in Prussia*, DTH-52

Ventas

El **CIDE** es una institución de educación superior especializada particularmente en las disciplinas de Economía, Administración Pública, Estudios Internacionales, Estudios Políticos, Historia y Estudios Jurídicos. El Centro publica, como producto del ejercicio intelectual de sus investigadores, **libros, documentos de trabajo**, y **cuatro revistas especializadas**: *Gestión y Política Pública*, *Política y Gobierno*, *Economía Mexicana Nueva Época* e *Istor*.

Para adquirir cualquiera de estas publicaciones, le ofrecemos las siguientes opciones:

VENTAS DIRECTAS:	VENTAS EN LÍNEA:
Tel. Directo: 5081-4003 Tel: 5727-9800 Ext. 6094 y 6091 Fax: 5727 9800 Ext. 6314 Av. Constituyentes 1046, 1er piso, Col. Lomas Altas, Del. Álvaro Obregón, 11950, México, D.F.	Librería virtual: **www.e-cide.com** Dudas y comentarios: **publicaciones@cide.edu**

¡¡Colecciones completas!!

Adquiere los **CDs de las colecciones completas** de los documentos de trabajo de todas las divisiones académicas del CIDE: **Economía**, **Administración Pública**, **Estudios Internacionales**, **Estudios Políticos**, **Historia** y **Estudios Jurídicos.**

¡Nuevo! ¡¡Arma tu CD!!

Visita nuestra Librería Virtual www.e-cide.com y selecciona entre 10 y 20 documentos de trabajo. A partir de tu lista te enviaremos un CD con los documentos que elegiste.